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9Abstract
This thesis is a qualitative investigation into the discourses that support wife-beating 
in Tanzania. Tanzania is recognised as a particularly peaceful country in the region. 
Nevertheless, one in two Tanzanians say a man can be right to beat his wife, 
according to the 2011 Demographic and Health Survey. What is the meaning of the 
violence that enjoys such wide support? Which wider discourses and shared social 
values does the support draw on and refer to?  These questions are explored by 
analysing the transcripts of 27 focus group discussions conducted in two disparate 
districts in Tanzania: Arumeru and Kigoma-Vijijini. The data were analysed in a 
constructionist manner, as public discourses constructed collectively. 
The thesis comprises three articles. The first concerns the data generation method. 
The power difference between researcher and researched, and the positionality of the 
white researcher in Tanzania, posed challenges to the data quality. I describe how 
maximising the distinguishing features of the focus group method, by decentering 
herself and encouraging interaction between participants, enabled her to address these 
challenges.
The second article speaks to ongoing debates on the relationship between partner 
violence and gender. It interrogates the ideal good beating that was constructed from 
the main interpretive repertoires that recurred across most groups, for resonance with 
theories of gender as a multilevel social structure. It concludes that hegemonic gender 
norms are among the norms supporting the good beating, and that the beating that is 
widely supported enforces the performance of gender, maintains gender hierarchies, 
and is in itself an enactment of gender. 
The third article examines the data for insights into how non-state violence can 
constitute social order. Here the good beating construct illustrates critical theories that 
reconceptualise social control and deviance as censure, as well as Gramscian notions 
of how coercion and consent combine in hegemony. This analysis speaks to the 
dilemma of how to interpret women’s support for practices that feminists claim 
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repress women, arguing that the dichotomy between consent and coercion is a false 
one. It concludes that wife-beating, where supported by community norms, can be 
seen as community norm enforcement.
The thesis relates the findings presented in the articles to how law, deviance, social 
control and censure have been theorised in criminology and socio-legal studies. It 
shows how theorizing on these issues can improve our understanding of non-state 
violence in the Global South and can in turn be improved by such an understanding.   
In particular, it shows how the hegemonic norms connected to wife-beating can be 
seen as non-state law. The legitimated beating is that which controls deviance and 
upholds community norms of social order. The ‘law’ it enforces and upholds 
constitutes an informal marital contract whereby husbands control their wives’ labour 
– a law which undermines structural gains towards gender equality.
The study has implications for how critical criminologists and other socio-legal 
scholars can engage better with Southern empirical realities. It recommends that they 
recognise that informal hegemonic norms at community level can play the same 
ruling role as that which makes formal law, law, in continuation of a colonial strategy 
of ruling by proxy. Regarding policy and practice on violence against women in East 
Africa, the conclusions of this study illustrate that serious progress requires a change 
in gender ideologies of inequality. 
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1. Introducing the research project 
a. How the research question emerged 
This thesis is about the social norms that support men’s physical violence against 
their female partners in Tanzania1. It was while working in a violence against women 
(VAW) intervention in Western Tanzania that I came to see this type of knowledge as 
important. I was evaluating the United Nations Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) Sexual 
and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) programme in the Great Lakes refugee camps 
there, which was to be the first of its kind, and the forerunner to GBV programmes in 
refugee and other displaced people’s camps across the world. The programme catered 
for refugees from neighbouring Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. The staff on this programme consisted of frontline workers from the refugee 
communities, middle managers from Tanzania, and top managers from various 
African, Asian and European countries. As is common in the humanitarian sector in 
Africa, this last group of ‘international’ staff had never lived in the country before, 
nor did they know Swahili, the national language. My position, then, as a white and 
therefore undeniably ‘international’ colleague, who had grown up in this ‘outpost’ 
and understood some of what my Swahili-speaking colleagues said, was an unusual 
one. From what my Tanzanian colleagues said between themselves and to me on the 
one hand, and what my European ‘compatriots’ said to me and to them on the other 
hand, I gained two very different impressions of the GBV programme. The 
Europeans assumed all staff on the program shared the programme’s stance on 
violence against women and the need to fight it. The shared mood I gathered from 
discussions with and between Tanzanian staff, however, suggested a different view of 
VAW and thus premise for the programme. According to this view, some forms of 
violence were clearly bad, but it was out of the question that using physical force 
                                              
1 I call this ‘wife-beating’, since that is the most commonly used English term in Tanzania. Since this is not the term 
commonly used in the Euro-American research literature, I will use the term ’domestic violence’ when discussing that 
literature. However in my use of the term ‘domestic violence’, I refer to the phenomenon that is known as ‘wife-beating’ in 
Tanzania. In limiting my focus to men’s physical violence against female partners, I do not mean to deny the existence of 
other violence.    
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against a woman, or coercing her to do something against her will, was bad in itself. 
Thus violence against a woman should not automatically be treated as something to 
be stopped. Most such cases should, and were, dealt with as a mutual conflict, and 
solved by counselling the woman to behave better.    
When colleagues spend hours, even days on end together, travel to remote field sites 
and tackle challenging conditions together, it is hard to believe that they are 
completely unaware that their views on the very topic they work on together diverge 
so dramatically. Indeed the Europeans’ view of VAW was no secret, as it was also 
the official agenda. Nor did the national staff seem to deliberately keep their 
divergence from this official view a secret. On the contrary, several national staff 
would open discussion on what is ‘really’ VAW. While these discussions would have 
juxtaposed the two understandings of VAW and made the divergence clear, the 
overture was always closed by the other side. I found the remarks with which this was 
done, particularly interesting. The reasoning for not having an open discussion 
between European and national staff, when the possibility arose, was always a 
combination of leaving the “cultural” to the field staff, and not wanting to hear 
tolerance of VAW. I interpreted this partly as pragmatic career choices to avoid 
inconvenient truths, but also as a more innocent belief in the prevailing paradigms of 
cultural sensitivity and adaptation to local norms, a belief that was unaccompanied by 
an awareness that these paradigms have their limitations. As a result of this 
discrepancy within the programme, the intervention that was intended to reduce the 
dangers women faced, actually increased them (Jakobsen, 2002).
My overwhelming impression from this experience was of how young European 
graduates arrived in Africa saddled with ideological baggage that restricted us all. 
This ideology seemed to demand that local understandings of VAW be placed in a 
box called ‘culture’ without so much as looking at them, and that once placed there, 
those understandings could not be taken out, discussed, or dealt with at all in any 
meaningful way. It made it impossible for any of us to actually engage with the very 
phenomenon we were working with, namely the VAW that was not already being 
prevented. 
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Subsequent experiences in the sector strengthened this impression. Eventually, a 
research idea emerged. I wanted to take these local meanings of wife-beating, which 
are so clearly there, yet so hidden, out into the open, and explore how we can look at 
them, analyse them, and engage with them critically. Not doing so can have real, 
human, tragic consequences, as my evaluation showed (Jakobsen, 2002).  
b. Research Question 
This research project essentially aims to answer one central question:  
What is the meaning of the wife-beating that is widely supported in Tanzania? 
To answer this question, I generated data on the social norms, common values and 
shared meanings that people referred to when discussing the rights and wrongs of 
wife-beating. In analysing these data, I asked myself the following questions: What 
does answering this research question tell us about how norms, power, consent and 
coercion are connected? What role do the norms supporting the beating play? How do 
they relate to the beating itself, to the violence and its effects? Why does the meaning 
of the supported beating matter? In relating my analysis to theory, I found that it 
spoke to two specific questions, which I used to organise the findings presented here. 
These questions are, “What is gendered about wife-beating in Tanzania?” and “How 
does support for wife-beating in Tanzania relate to social order?” Nevertheless, the 
main focus of the project remains the central research question.
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2. Theoretical and contextual background 
a. Gender relations and domestic violence in Tanzania 
i. Gender relations in Tanzania 
By socio-economic indicators, Tanzania is a Least Developed Country (LDC). Its 
GDP per capita is 608 US dollars. However, it is also known as a remarkably 
peaceful country. While neighbouring states have been plagued by conflicts between 
ethnic and religious groups, Tanzania boasts a tradition of peaceful coexistence 
between Muslims and Christians and 122 ethnicities. It is also the most economically 
equal society in East and Southern Africa, with a Gini Index of 38 (World Bank). 
Like the respondents in this study, the majority of Tanzanians (70%) live outside the 
urban centres in households engaged in small-scale agriculture (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2013a). Three in four adults have agriculture, livestock or fishing as their 
primary activity (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013c). Most households (70%) own 
their own land, and the mean area of land owned is 5,6 acres (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2013a, 2013c). One in ten Tanzanians live below the food poverty line 
which measures extreme poverty, and 28% of Tanzanians live below the basic needs 
poverty line. Literacy rates are high, but educational levels are low. Only one adult in 
five are illiterate, but four in five never reached beyond primary school (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2013a).  
Housing conditions give an idea of people’s everyday lives. A fifth of Tanzanians 
live in houses with cement walls, and a further 50% have walls of baked or sundried 
bricks. Sixty-five percent have iron sheet roofing, and 18% have electricity. However 
firewood remains the main source of energy for cooking for seven of every ten 
households (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013a).  
Regarding equality between men and women, Tanzania ranks in the more unequal 
end of the various international indices (Klasen & Schüler, 2011). The 
disproportionate time burden placed on women by the sexual division of labour is 
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now recognized as the main obstacle to improvements in women’s status (Leavens & 
Anderson, 2011). The division of labour time is most commonly estimated to be 12 to 
16 hours per day for women, and 6 to 8 hours per day for men (Leavens & Anderson, 
2011). Ninety-eight percent of rural women are engaged in agriculture, where it is not 
only housework and care work that is considered women’s work. Women are 
responsible for growing food for the family though subsistence farming, and for a 
substantial part of the labour involved in the husband’s cash crop farming. As wives 
carry farm supplies and produce as well as firewood and water for the household, 
women spend nearly three times as much time in transport as men, and transport four 
times as much in volume (World Bank, 2007). It is through this arrangement that 
88% of Tanzanian women can be classified as unpaid family workers on land they do 
not own (Warner & Campbell, 2000). 
A sexual division of labour that constitutes an intra-household rent agreement in this 
way is not uncommon in agrarian African societies (Darity, 2012). However, the 
proportion of women who work in agriculture in Tanzania (81%) is much higher than 
the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (55%) (Leavens & Anderson, 2011). Bryceson 
(1995ba) connects this division of labour to the organization of agriculture where 
land is abundant and capital investment in farming is extremely low. It is this form of 
‘hoe agriculture’ that most Tanzanians are still engaged in (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2013b). Bryceson’s theorization of hoe agriculture outlines the role of 
female labour in rural Tanzanian gender relations:  
Economic differentiation tends to be limited to that on the basis of age and 
gender, rather than class. Labour rather than land is the limiting factor of 
production, so control over labour is the source of male power and authority in 
the society. But control over female and youthful labour is technically 
problematic given hoe agriculture. Hoes are designed to be handled by only 
one person. The work process, although facilitated by collective effort, can be 
readily pursued by single individuals. Thus, ideological controls of an 
imperative nature must be exercised in order that men retain their ability to 
appropriate the labour power of their social subordinates. (As their control 
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over male youthful labour has ebbed away)…, male control over rural female 
labour has gained in importance. The tension between the technical possibility 
of women acting as direct producers and their social designation as men’s 
means of production, lies fundamentally at the heart of Tanzanian gender 
relations. It is the axis around which negotiations between the sexes take place. 
 (Bryceson, 1995a, pp. 47-48) 
Foremost among the “ideological controls” that Bryceson says male control over 
female labour requires is the cohabitation or marriage contract. By this she means not 
a tangible written contract, but simply “the cultural norms pertaining to the intra-
household pooling of individual entitlements” held by the social groupings the 
spouses belong to (p.43). In addition to the organization of the agricultural economy, 
larger historical forces such as migration, slavery and colonialism have shaped the 
current Tanzanian marriage contract (Bryceson, 1995a). 
In the ensuing scholarship, the question of whether and how events in the 1980s and 
‘90s changed the marriage contract is debated. The crisis in the Tanzanian economy 
and the ensuing Structural Adjustment Plan increased households’ need for cash. As a 
result, women entered the informal sector in large numbers, engaging in petty trading 
and other income-generating activities (Mascarenhas, 2007). The disagreement is 
over whether this weakened men’s control over women. The paid labour added to the 
burden of unpaid productive and reproductive labour allocated to women. Moreover, 
this pre-existing burden was increasing, as the AIDS pandemic raised the demand for 
unpaid care-work. To the extent that women’s entry into the cash economy led to a 
redistribution of unpaid labour within the household, it was not to men that the 
burden was shifted, but to children and poorer relatives (Koda, 2000). 
However, Tripp (1997) argues that even though income-generating activities have 
added to women’s workloads, these activities have also made women more 
independent. In many cases, the income gave a wife more autonomy from her 
husband and more leverage in negotiations with him, and through the activities that 
generated it, she developed social networks of her own. Some evidence suggests that 
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this development made women more successful in resisting labour exploitation in the 
better-off rural households (Mbilinyi, 1991).
Have women’s informal micro-enterprises transformed the Tanzanian marriage 
contract?  In many ways, the norms that Bryceson (1995) describes as the marriage 
contract at the time of this development are not so much challenged by these 
enterprises as they set the terms for them. The activities rural women engage in are 
those they can reconcile with the responsibilities and resources the contract has 
allocated to them. This is why their enterprises remain small-scale, informal and 
precarious, offering little opportunity for growth or upward mobility (World Bank, 
2007). Moreover, as wives increased their contribution to the household income, 
some husbands responded by reducing theirs, passing on the financial responsibilities 
for the children to the wife (Warner & Campbell, 2000). Thus, an overview of the 
scholarly debates on women’s changing position in the 1990s concluded that “in 
formal terms their legal and social position has improved, but in some respects their 
material position has declined while the ideological legacy of the past has hardly 
been dented” (Creighton & Omari, 1995; emphasis added). 
More recent research shows that norms of wifely servitude continue alongside 
women’s paid labour. Not only rural smallholders, but even young men at university 
in the capital expect women to work longer hours than them and to serve their 
husbands at home (Feinstein, Feinstein, & Sabrow, 2010). The expectation of female 
subservience continues to circumscribe women’s opportunities in waged labour in the 
formal sector in cities (Fischer, 2014).  Moreover, survey findings of who controls 
women’s income now show that rather than challenge the norm that husbands are 
entitled to the fruits of his wife’s labour, women’s paid labour conforms to this norm.
In 2009, only 28% of rural women controlled the income they earned as their own. 
Almost a quarter of rural wives reported that their husband alone controlled the cash 
the woman had earned (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). This is in line with 
findings on general decision-making in marriages. When asked whether they had a 
say in decisions about their own healthcare, about major household purchases, or 
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decisions to visit family or relatives, one in three rural women replied in the negative 
to all three questions (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011).     
Nevertheless, change is underway. Severe limitations on women’s ability to own their 
own land have maintained a material basis for the intra-household rent agreement 
described above. Women own less than one-fifth of all titled land, and their plots are 
generally smaller and of lower quality than men’s plots (Leavens & Anderson, 2011). 
In 2014, however, a new constitution was proposed which explicitly guarantees equal 
land rights to women. This is expected to be approved in 2015.   
ii. Domestic violence in Tanzania 
Men’s physical violence against their female partners is currently a universal 
phenomenon.  The pursuit of accurate and reliable measures of the scope of this 
violence is ongoing, as are efforts to arrive at international statistical standards that 
make such prevalence data comparable across countries and regions. This latter has 
been explicitly prioritized by UN and other international and regional bodies in the 
past decade (UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, 2010). The World 
Health Organisation’s multi-country study on women’s health and domestic violence 
found the lifetime prevalence of physical partner violence ranged from 13% in Japan 
to 51% in rural Peru (Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise, & Watts, 2005). The 
United Nations Statistical Division’s latest global overview of prevalence studies 
finds lifetime prevalence rates ranging from 6% in China to over 48% in Zambia, 
Ethiopia and Peru (UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, 2010, p. p.131). 
The latest regional survey of VAW in the EU, found that 22% of ever-partnered 
European women had experienced sexual and/or physical violence from a partner 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014). 
In Africa, one in three women have experienced physical partner violence, according 
to a systematic review of prevalence rates across the continent (Alhabib, Nur, & 
Jones, 2010). However, Prabhu et al. (2011) point to the wide range of prevalence 
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estimates—from 18 to 71%—to illustrate that survey accuracy is especially 
challenging on this continent. 
In Tanzania, two in five women are estimated to have experienced physical partner 
violence (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Table 1 draws on the prevalence data 
which are presented as comparable in the UN Statistical Division’s overview of 
prevalence rates, to give an idea of how prevalent this violence is in Tanzania in 
comparison to some European and African countries.
Table 1. Prevalence of partner VAW in percentage of ever-partnered women aged 15-49.
Tanzania 
(Dar Es 
Salaam)a
Tanzania 
(Mbeya)a
Tanzania 
(national)b
Ethiopia
(rural)a
Zambiaa
England 
&
Walesc
Norwayc Germanyc
Physical  violence
Lifetime 33 47 39 49 48 19 -- 28 
Past
year
15 19 33 29 27 3 -- -- 
Physical  and/or  sexual  violence 
Lifetime 41 56 44* 71 48 -- 27 29 
Past
year
22 29 38* 54 27 -- 6 3 
*Current/most recent partner only. Sources: (a) WHO Multicountry Study of Domestic Violence and Women’s Health; 
(b)The 2010 Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey; (c)United Nations’ The World’s Women, 2010.  
One striking feature of these Demographic and Health Survey results is that the 
number of Tanzanian women who say they have experienced violence in the past 12 
months is very close to the number who say they have ever experienced it. This could 
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mean either that the survey failed to capture memories that were over a year old, or 
that the violence was a stable feature of the lives of the women who experienced it. 
Studies of how the violence correlates with individual and household characteristics 
have yielded mixed results. McCloskey et al. (2005) found a correlation with some of 
the indicators they used to represent gender inequality in their household survey of 
Moshi Urban district in Northern Tanzania. Women they interviewed whose 
husbands made a low-level financial contribution, who had only primary school 
education or less, and who had co-wives, were more likely to report abuse. 
Interviewees who said they had trouble conceiving were also at a higher risk, they 
found, but so were women who had five or more children.
Analyses of the data from the 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, however, show 
no significant correlation between violence and educational levels. Furthermore, they 
show that women’s employment – often used as an indicator of women’s 
empowerment – is associated with higher risks of violence. Vyas and Heise (2014) 
found this association to hold even after using Propensity Score Matching to account 
for underlying differences between women who were engaged in productive work 
outside the home and women who were not. However, they also found that in rural
areas, women who were paid cash for productive work outside the home were not at 
higher risk. They explain this by the likelihood that the work was agricultural work 
and thus did not violate the prevailing norms of expected wifely behaviour. 
The 2010 Demographic and Health Survey questionnaire also includes questions 
about husbands’ controlling behaviours. Almost half of ever-married women said 
their husband insisted on knowing where they were at all times. Of the women who 
said their husband exhibited five or more controlling behaviours, 75% also said he 
used physical violence. 
Both 2004 and 2010 versions of the Tanzanian  Demographic and Health Survey 
included questions on attitudes towards wife-beating. In 2004, 42% of men and 60% 
of women said a man could be justified in beating his wife for at least one of five 
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specified reasons given. By 2010 this had fallen slightly, to 38% of men and 54% of 
women (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011).  
Two aspects of these data merit particular attention here. The first is that more 
women than men support wife-beating. This finding has been reproduced across Sub-
Saharan Africa (Uthman, Moradi, & Lawoko, 2009). It raises a question on which 
this study sheds light: How can women comply in their own subjugation? Or, 
conversely, is wife-beating oppressive to women if women themselves support it?
The second aspect of the data is simply that wife-beating is widely tolerated and 
justified in Tanzanian society. This resonates with qualitative studies by feminist 
activists and health professionals (e.g., Laisser, Nyström, Lugina, & Emmelin, 2011; 
McCleary-Sills, 2013; Tanzania Media Women's Association, 2013; USAID, 2008). 
A recent research report by Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) found 
that wife-beating was considered so normal and legitimate as to be a non-issue 
(Tanzania Media Women's Association, 2013). Similarly, health service evaluations 
cite women saying they expect beating as a part of marriage, and that men and 
women blame women for causing it (McCleary-Sills, 2013; USAID, 2008). 
Respondents near a hospital in Dar Es Salaam said women accept a certain amount of 
violence as a form of discipline (Laisser et al., 2011). 
 Wife-beating is not formally criminalized in Tanzania. The 1971 Law of Marriage 
Act forbids spouses from inflicting corporal punishment on one another, but no 
sanction is attached to this. Violence against women features prominently in official 
government discourse in terms of international legal instruments and policy 
documents. For instance, the Tanzanian government has ratified all the major 
international human rights instruments pertaining to VAW (World Bank, 2007). More 
unusually, it lists domestic violence in its National Strategy for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction (MKUKUTA) as one of the targeted poverty indicators (USAID, 2008).
Civil society activists, however, argue that official plans and policies do not translate 
into improvements in women’s lived realities (Women's Legal Aid Centre, 2007). 
The National Plan of Action for the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against 
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Women and Children (2001) remains largely unimplemented (USAID, 2008). A 
variety of NGOs run legal aid programmes to help women navigate the justice 
system, but these are largely limited to the capital and cannot under the current legal 
system represent a woman in violence cases. Gender desks have been set up in some 
police stations, and there are two shelters for survivors of VAW in Dar Es Salaam. 
Overall, formal support services for survivors are minimal, and almost non-existent 
outside the capital (USAID, 2008).  The overwhelming majority of VAW is never 
reported, neither to police nor to health or social services. An investigation into 
survivors’ help-seeking pathways concluded the following: 
…even when a survivor does seek help, her pathway frequently begins and 
ends with the family. For example, a married woman who experiences partner 
violence is expected to first speak with her husband’s family members. While 
some mechanisms exist for family meetings to address such marital issues, the 
ultimate goal of any actions taken is to reconcile the marriage, and not 
necessarily to address the woman’s needs or concerns. 
 (McCleary-Sills, 2013, p. vii) 
Nevertheless, there has been promising change since the time I generated the data 
presented in this thesis. In 2011, a set of policies to improve the health sector’s 
response to VAW were put in place. This, together with the recent establishment of a 
national multi-sectoral committee on violence against women and children, are taken 
by practitioners as signs that the Government of Tanzania is increasing its attention to 
VAW (Betron, 2013).
b. Researching domestic violence 
The body of research on domestic violence is vast. Rather than attempt an exhaustive 
overview of the field, I will highlight two aspects of the Anglophone literature that 
are relevant to the research presented here. I will then describe how these play out in 
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the Sub-Saharan region that Tanzania is part of. Against this general background, I 
will give a more detailed account of feminist theorising regarding how the violence is 
related to the unequal gender order often referred to as patriarchy. 
The first aspect of the literature is the imbalance between quantitative data, mostly on 
the individual level, and social theory. Several scholars (e.g., Anderson, 2005; 
Hunnicutt, 2009) have pointed out that the proliferation of statistical data on the 
prevalence of the violence, and its correlation with other factors (variously identified 
as causes, effects, ‘risk factors’, ‘protective factors’, ‘predictors’, ‘costs’, ‘needs’ or 
‘vulnerabilities’) has not been accompanied by comparable gains in our theoretical 
understanding of the phenomenon. As Dutton (2004) has pointed out, the ‘ecological 
model’ commonly presented in lieu of theory is in fact no theory at all, but simply a 
framework by which to organise risk factors (p.168). 
Exceptions to this include feminist researchers who have continued to generate data-
driven theoretical observations (e.g., Stanko, 1997; Stark, 2007; Westmarland & 
Kelly, 2012). This is not surprising given that it was feminists who first placed 
domestic violence on the research agenda, precisely because they saw it as connected 
to structures of power and control in society, rather than as an individual ailment. 
However, the second aspect of the literature worth noting is that it is dominated by 
approaches that either ignore or reject feminist conceptualisations of the violence 
(Dragiewicz, 2011; Hanmer & Itzin, 2013; Winstok & Eisikovits, 2011). The Conflict 
Tactics Survey (CTS) connected with the ‘gender symmetry’ approach described in 
Article 2 is the most widely used survey instrument globally. Related to this are 
arguments such as Felson’s (2002) that VAW reflects violence in general, not 
gendered power relations. Feminists have lobbied for terms that made it clearer that 
their concern was with men’s violence against women than the term ‘domestic 
violence’ suggested. The terms most widely used now in the Anglophone literature,
‘intimate partner violence’ and ‘family violence’, are no less clear on this than 
‘domestic violence’ is. As I explain in Article 2 of this thesis, the increasingly 
popular terms “gender-based violence” and “gender violence” do not necessarily 
denote a feminist approach to the violence, and are most commonly used for other 
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forms of VAW than domestic violence. Already in the 1990s, feminist VAW 
researchers remarked how swiftly domestic violence had been appropriated by non-
feminist actors, as Kathleen Ferraro did in the US: “How has a feminist-inspired 
movement to help battered women and control male violence turned into an apolitical 
‘women’s issue’ promoted by some of the most reactionary and exploitative 
politicians and institutions?” (Ferraro, 1996, p. 78). Feminist approaches dominate 
neither interventions against, nor research on, domestic violence (Bumiller, 2010; 
Kelly, 2005). 
How are these tendencies reflected in the literature on domestic violence in Sub-
Saharan Africa?  As I describe in Article 2 of this thesis, social science in Africa is 
heavily influenced by the international development industry. Most of the research on 
VAW is geared instrumentally towards donor-funded interventions, which are largely 
limited to health services, or women’s empowerment projects described as “less-than-
radical gender interventions, in which gender is applied as a depoliticized, technical 
device, generating log frames and statistics, but doing little to challenge unjust gender 
relations” (Mama, 2007, p. 153). As a result, there has been a surge also in Sub-
Saharan Africa in quantitative and applied research without a comparable increase in 
publications that relate domestic violence to social theory, let alone feminist theory.   
Feminist conceptualizations of VAW and gender orders 
The idea that violence is important as part of an unequal gender order—the 
subordination of women to men—is central to feminist understandings of violence 
against women. Both feminists and their critics, however, have pointed out that the 
exact role of violence against women in the gender order remains unclear. Which 
causes which between the subordination of women and violence against women? Do 
men abuse their wives because power inequality means they can? Or is power 
inequality a result of their ability to abuse their wives?  Is the violence facilitated by 
women’s subordination? Or is it provoked by their lack of it? Is VAW a last resort for 
those men who lack the means that more powerful men have of dominating women? 
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Or is it, on the contrary, a means at the disposal of men whose domination is so 
secure that they can get away with violence?  Is violence a sign of power, or of 
weakness?2
Feminist activists have pointed to male domination both as the intended effect of 
VAW (since Dobash & Dobash, 1979), and as the root cause of VAW (Johnson & 
Ferraro, 2004). Empirical research on the relationship has reflected rather than 
resolved this ambiguity, and consists mainly of quantitative macro investigations into 
whether gender inequality is a predictor of the violence. The results, as reviewed by 
Hunnicutt (2009), are mixed, with a decrease in gender inequality predicting both 
increases and decreases in VAW.
Meanwhile, research on male perpetrators of VAW has found that they typically 
choose for their victim a woman they have some power over (Horvath, Kelly, & 
Britain, 2006), but also that they see the violence as a way to assert power over the 
woman they victimize (Hearn, 1998; Messerschmidt, 2013b), and that they depict the 
partner they beat as dominating them (Anderson & Umberson, 2001). Some 
researchers have concluded from such findings that men who beat their wives are 
motivated not by power, but by their perceived powerlessness (Messerschmidt, 
2013a), and that this form of VAW is best understood “not as an expression of power, 
but rather as an instance of its collapse” (Kimmel, 2002; also endorsed by Ray, 
2011). As Johnson (1995) points out, however, this is not to say that VAW is actually 
an underdog’s last self-defence against female supremacy. Instead, he posits, the 
actual rise in women’s power against which VAW is a backlash is a rise large enough 
to threaten men’s sense of dominance, but not large enough to attain equality, let 
alone dominance. The perpetrators themselves assess the increase in women’s status 
as not only one that must be negated with violence because it threatens the gender 
order, but also one that still can be negated with violence because it has not
                                              
2 This conundrum has implications beyond the academic. The question of whether increased gender equality leads to more 
or less violence against women is also a real-world concern for policy-makers, practitioners and activists. For example, in 
one discussion among technical experts on GBV at the senior inter-agency level, several EuroAmerican practitioners said 
the increased VAW was due to too many women’s empowerment projects, and was solved by setting up equivalent projects 
for men. 
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overturned the gender order. In the model Stark (2007) builds from his work with 
victims and perpetrators, the historical trend of women moving up the gender order is 
accompanied by husbands’ increased use of coercion to control their wives. He 
describes this upward movement as women moving “up to inequality” to emphasise 
that it does not take women up to equality with men, let alone domination over them 
(p. 171). 
Nevertheless, scholars leave themselves open to charges of self-contradiction when 
they present men’s VAW as a result of threats against their superiority while 
simultaneously supporting gender equality as the solution—as Anderson (2009) 
points out in her critique of Stark’s (2007) model. The clue to resolving this, she 
claims, lies in understanding gender as a multilevel social structure.
The concept of gender as a multi-layered social structure emerges from an integrative 
body of theory developed by several scholars (Ferree, Lorber, & Hess, 1999; Martin, 
2003, 2004; Ridgeway, 2007, 2009; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004; Risman, 2004, 2011; 
Risman & Davis, 2013) who understand gender as “an institutionalized system of 
social practices for constituting people as two significantly different categories, men 
and women, and organising social relations of inequality on the basis of that 
difference”(Ridgeway & Correll, 2004, p. 510). Conceptualising gender as a 
multilevel structure makes it possible to think of different dimensions of the gender 
order being created, maintained or challenged in different ways at the same time. 
While the precise wording varies among the models (Risman, 2004), the levels are 
typically described as the macro/structural/institutional level, the 
interactional/interpersonal level, and the individual/personal level. Inequalities at one 
level can influence inequalities on other levels, but whether and how this happens is 
left open to empirical investigation. The precise form an unequal gender order takes 
varies across time and place, not only as a whole, but also in each of its dimensions, 
which in turn may influence one another in varied ways. As a result, a multitude of 
different constellations of unequal gender orders are possible. 
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In Africa, the indicators used to measure ‘gender inequality’ in social research and 
the health and development sector that dominates it are socio-economic indicators, 
such as sex-disaggregated data on education, income, employment, and political 
office. It is these indicators that interventions aimed at reducing violence against 
women through ‘women’s empowerment’ refer to. When we understand gender as a 
multilevel social structure, we can see that these indicators capture only one level of 
the gender structure, namely the institutional or macro level of gender inequality. The 
full picture of how VAW relates to the gender order is only revealed when we include 
also the interpersonal and individual levels of gender, and the dynamics between
these levels (Anderson, 2005). Gender inequality at the institutional level does not 
provide the full picture of the gender order, since it leaves us guessing as to the shape 
of the gender order at the other levels. However, examining gender at the middle 
level can give useful insights into gender at the two other levels, according to 
Ridgeway (2007, 2009). In particular, the ideological dimension of this interpersonal 
level—the cultural norms governing how men and women relate to one another in 
social relations—is key to how principles organising society at the macro level are 
derived from individual differences (Ibid.). Similarly, Risman (2004) points out that it 
is knowledge about the gender structure at this “dimension of cultural interactional 
expectations” that is useful for social change, “as it is here that work needs to begin” 
(p. 446).  In international policy and practice, the neglect of such norms of everyday 
interactions between men and women is associated with the loss of feminist framings 
of VAW (Kelly, 2005). The conceptualisation of gender as a multilevel structure that 
I will work with, then, is one that pays particular attention to the ideological 
dimension of the entire structure, but especially at the level of interpersonal relations. 
The extent to which the gender inequality represented by socio-economic indicators 
coincides with the gender inequality found at other levels, and the dynamics that 
result between the levels, is key to the relationship between the gender order and 
VAW (Anderson, 2005). In addition, disjunctions between ideological and other 
dimensions can explain incongruities in empirical research on the role of VAW in 
patriarchy, according to Hunnicutt (2009). She claims that the reason macro studies 
of the relations between VAW and gender inequality have yielded mixed results is 
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that they fail to consider the degree to which the ideological dimension of gender 
inequality coincides with the macro dimensions they measure. She points out that 
where some structural constraints to gender equality in the political and economic 
spheres are removed, but at the same time, norms and values that prescribe gender 
inequality in these spheres remain in place, then the apparent advances towards a 
more equal gender order may be accompanied by increases in VAW. This would not 
actually be a case of VAW caused by gender equality, but if we did not look at the 
ideological dimension of the gender order, we might well conclude that it was. If we 
looked at all dimensions, we would be able to see that it was in the absence of a 
change in the ideological dimension of the gender order to accompany the reduction 
of structural gender inequality that VAW increased. 
The particular importance of social norms, values and beliefs regarding gender—the 
ideological dimension—in understanding the role of VAW in patriarchy is recognized 
by several scholars, including Anderson (2005), who points to findings that the 
empowerment of individual women in India led to more intimate partner violence in 
areas where cultural conservatism was high (Koenig, Ahmed, Hossain, & Mozumder, 
2003). It is because “gender ideology that favours gender inequality can diminish 
structural gains” made towards gender equality that Hunnicutt (2009, p. 566) 
recommends that feminists build theory on how VAW and male dominance are 
linked by mapping the variety of not only structural but also ideological shapes that 
patriarchy takes across time, space and material contexts. The data presented here 
contribute towards this. 
The multilevel model of gender enables empirical investigations of how gender order 
and VAW are related beyond the one-dimensional question of which-causes-which. 
The multiplicity of levels is one reason why the model makes it possible to research 
such relationships “without accepting simplistic unidirectional arguments” (Risman 
2004, p. 434). Another is its incorporation of Giddens’ (1979) notion of structuration, 
by which the social structures which constrain people’s choices are themselves the 
product of people’s choices. The social structure of gender is thus characterised by 
the duality of structure, which Giddens describes as
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…the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: 
structure is both medium and outcome of reproduction of practices. Structure 
enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, 
and 'exists' in the generating moments of this constitution. 
(Giddens, 1979, p. 5) 
Framing gender as a dual structure makes it possible to understand causality between 
the gender order and VAW as recursive: The gender order may shape the choice of 
whether or not to be violent, but violence may also shape the gender order. When 
both are possible, it is no longer the either-or question that is the obvious line of 
inquiry into understanding how violence against women relates to their subordinate 
position in the gender order. Among the other lines of inquiry that seem more 
promising as a result is the one pursued here: how norms supporting the violence 
relate to the gender order.
c. Africa in Social Science 
This research project necessitates clarification on two issues. What place is there for 
“Western” social science in Africa? And what place for Africa in social science? I 
will deal with each of these two questions in turn. 
i. Applying “Western” theory to Africa 
Using social theory to understand empirical data is a mainstay of social science, yet 
fraught with particular ethical and epistemological difficulties when the empirical 
reality studied is situated in Africa. Since almost all scientific theory can be labelled 
“Western”, to apply theories from social science to African empirical realities, as I do 
in this thesis, is to expose oneself to charges of racism and imperialism. I will 
therefore address these charges here, separately from the specific theories I aim to 
use.
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ii.    Pulling up the drawbridge, or being quarantined? 
Transposing Western constructs to developing countries without attention to 
difference and local context does smack of empire, and has quite rightly been charged 
with ethnocentric imperialism. As well as being ethically objectionable, it makes for 
inaccurate science and ineffective interventions. In this sense, the postcolonial 
critique of the wholesale export and imposition of constructs, theories and methods 
that are developed in the so-called West, without contextualization, is a necessary 
one.
It is precisely to steer clear of such continued injustice, however, that several scholars 
in and of the post-colonies question the ethical and epistemological superiority of the 
stance that “Western” theory should not be used in the Global South. They reject the 
claim that this is a counter-stance to ethnocentric imperialism. The work of post-
colonial philosopher Uma Narayan, for instance, exposes the logical and ethical 
fallacies by which Western scholars claim ‘their’ social science does not apply to the 
so-called Non-West. For example, by explaining how “Western”, “non-Western”, and 
the difference between them were themselves  “politically motivated colonial 
constructions” for imperial purposes, she shows that it is a mistake to equate cultural 
imperialism with the assumption of sameness, and to thereby think that respecting 
non-Western difference is a counter-stance to imperialism (Narayan, 1998, p. 89).   
One implication of this is that attention to difference does not in itself make social 
science less imperialistic than assumptions of sameness. Cain (2000) builds this 
argument by positioning sameness and difference as two equally problematic starting 
points, the first ‘occidentalist’ and the second ‘orientalist’. Social scientists engaging 
with Southern empirical realities need to beware of both these twin evils, she 
emphasizes, since orientalism—assuming that ‘Other’ societies are completely 
different from our own, that ‘they’ are everything that ‘we’ are not—is no less 
ethnocentric than the occidentalism it seeks to avoid3.
                                              
3 This is a simplified version of Said’s (1978) more complex concept of ‘orientalism’.
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For postcolonial theorist Mbembe, it is “in relation to Africa that the notion of 
otherness has been taken farthest” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 2). He describes the 
implications of exempting Africa from social science and “all that holds elsewhere”as 
offensive, if not racist: 
Whether in everyday discourse or in ostensibly scholarly narratives, the 
continent is the very figure of ‘the strange’. It is similar to that inaccessible 
‘Other with a capital O’ evoked by Jacques Lacan. In this extremity of the 
Earth, reason is supposedly permanently at bay, and the unknown has 
supposedly attained its highest point. Africa, a headless figure threatened with 
madness and quite innocent of any notion of center, hierarchy or stability, is 
portrayed as … a bottomless abyss where everything is noise, yawning gap, 
and primordial chaos. 
(Mbembe, 2001, p. 3) 
The stance that Africa is too different from “the West” for social scientists to use 
“Western theories” there, then, is not a stance against ethnocentrism, imperialism and 
racism. Furthermore, seen from the vantage point of social scientists actually working 
in and on Africa, it does more harm to African social science than good. Sociologist 
Ari Sitas describes its “counter-damage”: reducing “a complex intellectual heritage in 
one grand counter-gesture” leaves little “creative breathing space for sociologists in 
the South” (Sitas, 2006, p. 360). Similarly, in gender studies, African social scientists 
have described how the fixation with difference and “Africanicity”, a preoccupation 
they attribute primarily to Westerners and anthropologists, has undermined 
possibilities for critical social research in Africa (Lewis, 2004, 2008; McFadden, 
2004). Their argument that the stance serves to depoliticize research on issues that are 
essentially about power relations, makes sense: a stance that isolates a society as an 
“exception, its power relations exempt from theoretical analysis” would logically 
benefit the more powerful within that society (Mbembe, 2012, p. 11).
From an African vantage point, then, the prohibition against using non-African 
theories to understand social phenomena in Africa seems not so much a case of 
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African social science pulling up the drawbridge against imperialism, as it is African 
social science being placed under embargo, or quarantined. Thus the task of a 
researcher who wants to add usefully to an understanding of power relations locally 
without repeating imperialist mistakes of the past is more complex than a simple 
insistence on the non-applicability of ‘Western’ theory can afford. However, also 
when it stops short of explicitly prohibiting theory, the orientalist approach is still one 
of the two routes that Cain warns criminologists to steer clear of when engaging with 
the Global South. Instead, she recommends finding a way between (or perhaps 
beyond) orientalism and occidentalism. This is what I try to do in the research 
presented here.
The route Cain (2001) recommended over a decade ago remains the road less-
travelled, in that a post-colonial qualitative researcher in Africa is still expected to 
take an orientalist approach. Coincidentally, the work she points to as exemplifying 
orientalist approaches to Africa deals with couple conflict in the exact same location 
as one of my field sites. I will now build on and extend her critique of this work with 
my own. The purpose of this is to concretise what the above somewhat abstract 
critiques of orientalism entail in critical criminological engagement with African 
empirical realities, in order to explicate my own position. 
iii. An orientalist approach to couple conflict in a Tanzanian 
community  
”Let us take our point of departure far away. Let us move to Tanzania. Let us 
approach our problem from the sunny hillside of the Arusha province.”  This is how 
couple conflict in Tanzania first enters the criminological literature. The article to 
take Tanzania as its point of departure was a seminal one: Nils Christie’s (1977, p. 2) 
“Conflict as Property”, published in a flagship journal over three decades ago, is 
currently a criminological classic, and a foundational text in restorative justice and 
informal dispute resolution. 
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It is also, I will argue, a classic example of how not to approach the Global South as a 
critical criminologist. I do so in order to illustrate the pitfalls that face any social 
scientist aiming to make theoretical sense of empirical data from the Global South, 
and to explain how I chose to navigate this difficult terrain.
Nils Christie uses the case from a community court in Arusha as an illustration of his 
larger argument that the formal criminal justice system in “our” societies amounts to 
the ‘theft’ of conflicts from victims and neighbourhoods by bureaucrats and 
professionals. He introduces the case as a “happening”. He describes it as happy and 
lively, and eventually tells us that it is a court case. The case being tried is that of two 
“former lovers”, he informs us: she wants to break it off, and the purpose of the court 
is to determine how much she owes him for clothes she has worn and expenses he has 
covered.
He then completes the description by saying that the points worth noting are those on 
which it differs from Western court cases, and listing these. The parties to the conflict 
were at the centre of the room, spoke actively and were eagerly listened to; their 
friends, neighbours, and relatives, as well as the wider audience, chipped in but did 
not take over; the local party secretaries took a back seat, and there were no reporters, 
because “everybody” was there. 
What role does this foundational text of community justice give to Tanzanian 
empirical data?  The description of how a conflict between a couple is dealt with by a 
Tanzanian community serves simply as a colourful and exotic illustration of what 
“we” in modern societies have lost. Christie then proceeds to his argument proper, 
which is that “we” have too many professionals, and have lost our neighbourhoods 
and sense of community—yet can, through the lesson to be learned from this happy 
happening on those ‘sunny hillsides’, regain what we have lost.
The trouble with this approach, as my above demarcation of “we” suggests, is that it 
centres around the West: the writer and the reader are both presumed to be Western, 
and the reader’s existing and also desired knowledge is presumed to be about 
Western empirical realities. Where is the presumed reader ‘coming from’, in terms of 
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what she is already familiar with, her pre-existing knowledge? Certainly not Africa. 
Africa is “far away” from the “here” of criminological inquiry, although thanks to 
Christie, she will get a glimpse into it. Nor is Africa where she wants to go: this 
criminological article does not aim to help her make sense of criminological 
phenomena in Africa. African empirical realities are interesting only in so far as they 
help us see Western empirical reality in a new light. 
This dependence of Christie’s story on a Euro-American vantage point is more easily 
seen by considering how the story holds up when surveyed from a vantage point 
outside of Euro-America. Obviously, for a reader based in Tanzania, Tanzania is not 
“far away”. However, seeing a European present “the sunny hillside of Arusha 
province” as far away from himself, also seems bizarre. There is not, nor has there 
ever been, any “Arusha province”, but that is a minor detail. The region known as 
Arusha is cold and misty. It is not “sunny” by Tanzanian standards, and even less so 
in an African perspective. Due to its cool climate and high altitudes, Arusha 
accommodated some of the earliest European settlers, schools and hospitals in East 
Africa. Because of the infrastructure that has resulted from this continued Euro-
American influence, as well as its low temperatures, some Tanzanians will say that 
Arusha is kama Ulaya: like Europe. Thus Arusha is neither sunny, nor provincial, nor 
far far away. As will be seen in Section 2D of this thesis, the court that Christie saw 
was itself a product of this western influence, rather than an indigenous African 
‘other’ way of doing things. 
What we also see when we look at Christie’s Tanzanian case from a less Eurocentric
vantage point, is a number of cracks that he glosses over. From a non-white vantage 
point, the most conspicuous detail in the room into which Christie invites the reader, 
is not the ways in which Tanzania is different from Europe. The most conspicuous 
detail, in fact the elephant in the room, is his own white self. To what extent is the 
story he tells us simply a reflection of how things are presented to “wazungu”4  like 
                                              
4 This is the Swahili term used to refer to white people/foreigners. It is sometimes derogatory.  
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him? How would he know, for instance, that the man and the woman were eagerly 
listened to, and that the relatives merely contributed, but did not “take over” in having 
their say, and that the audience were joking in a good-natured way, and not jeering in 
a mocking way?  Such nuances and meanings are not easily conveyed in translation. 
Christie never mentions that the story he tells us is what was translated to him, but the 
languages involved make it unlikely that it was not. Christie glosses over the effect of 
his own positionality on the story he tells. 
Also absent from Christies account are power relations within the scene he describes. 
He presents the case as an innocuous one: A man and a woman were “lovers”, and 
now she wants to “break it off”. The community simply wants to help the couple by 
making sure this happens in the correct way: calculating the cost of clothes worn is 
complicated. While Christie presents the community process as an ideal for 
emulation, an observer more familiar with power relations in this empirical context 
will see warning lights making them wary of such an idealization. From this vantage 
point, the “investment” Christie refers to, that the woman is asked to return, is all too 
recognizable as “bride price”, which often ends up with the woman’s parents. If that 
is the case, then this is no simple lovers’ tiff, with relatives benignly trying to help the 
young couple calculate their debts fairly. Such a recognition would throw into 
disarray Christie’s entire analysis of the actors’ respective roles and the idealness 
thereof. Or to put it more bluntly, as an actual Tanzanian reader of Christie’s 
anecdote did: “This is just a story of how a  community gathers to decide whether a 
woman is allowed to end her sexual relations with a man without returning him 
certain items, even the clothes off her back. I mean, how black must we be, for you 
guys not to see that?”5.
Thus Christie’s celebrated description of a Tanzanian community response to a 
couple’s conflict is inaccurate and idealized. His depiction of the Tanzanian model is 
informed not so much by a contextual understanding of Tanzania, as by a 
                                              
5 This is how a Tanzanian student responded to this article after I had shared it with her by email, as explained in Section 
3A.
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disenchantment with the Western model. One might argue that this does not matter, 
since the focus is not on Tanzania, but on critiquing the Western criminal justice 
system. To argue thus, however, would only bring the eurocentrism into sharper 
relief:  Non-Western empirical realities are only interesting for the pedagogical 
contrast they provide to the real scientific endeavour, which is to understand to the 
West.
Nevertheless, the suggestion that all the writer sees in Tanzania is Tanzanians’ 
blackness, seems at first like an unfair accusation of racism. After all, it was by 
refusing to take the role expected of him as a Norwegian in 1970s Tanzania, a role he 
found imperialist, that Christie arrived at his alternative reading of Tanzanian 
empirical reality. In what was the heyday of European ‘experts’  teaching Tanzanians 
in villages across the country how to build new institutions, situating the ‘expertise’ 
among the villagers themselves, and saying it was European institutions that could 
learn from them, was a way to turn the tables on the white arrogance he felt expected 
to step into.
What the Tanzanian reader is reacting to, however, is the orientalism that results from 
an unreflective reaction to occidentalism. In other words, when our main goal in 
relating to African empirical realities is to remember to factor in and valorise 
difference, we fail to recognize familiar phenomena as familiar when we see them 
among the Other. Thus when a Tanzanian reader says “This is just a story of (X). 
How (Y) must we be (to you), for you not to see that?”, he is critiquing the writer for 
not recognizing the familiar and unexotic phenomenon X because of his exaggerated 
and inappropriate focus on difference Y. Regardless of whether Y is skin colour, 
what he is reacting against is orientalism, which he denounces as racist. 
Christie is far from the only social scientist whose attempts to avoid ethnocentric 
imperialism have resulted in an orientalist approach that is no less fraught with it. 
Indeed, efforts to escape the “West is Best” narrative frequently end up in the equally 
West-centred narrative of the “Big Bad West” (Narayan, 2013). Christie’s approach 
matches what Africanists Comaroff and Comaroff (2012) describe as a 
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romanticisation of African realities on the basis that they are not like “us” —which is 
no less self-obsessed, they point out, than a rejection of African realities on the basis 
that they are not like “us”. Overturning the occidentalist approach to the Global South 
in this way, they argue, is a widespread approach that “courts the same self-obsession 
[it] faults.”(p.116). It is simply “turning the story upside-down, while leaving intact 
the Manichean dualism that holds Euro-America and its others in the same fixed 
embrace.”(p.117)
iv. The Global South as the future of social science 
While the prospects of engaging theoretically with African empirical realities have 
been marred by the West-obsessed framing of the continent as Other, Africa-focused 
criminologists have been making do by ‘looting the conceptual toolbox’ (Dixon, 
2004). The past decade, however, has seen a shift in Western academia away from 
the questions of whether Western theory can be applied to Africa, and whether ‘they’ 
are similar or different to ’us’, to questioning the value of social theory that excludes 
Africa. I read this development optimistically, as signalling an emerging recognition 
of the value of studying Southern empirical realities not for what they tell us about 
the West, but because we need social science that can make sense of more than a 
minority of human society, and that for social theories to be truly social, they need to 
speak to Southern as well as Northern empirical realities. 
A growing number of social scientists from disparate disciplines are beginning to 
question the assumptions by which Tanzania, like the majority of the world, has been 
firmly placed outside the remit of modernist social science (e.g., Aas, 2007; Aas, 
2012; Bhambra, 2007; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012; Connell, 2007, 2011; Rosa, 
2014). They claim that social theory is flawed as a result of these longstanding 
assumptions, and that the greatest potential for its improvement, and in that sense the 
future of social science, lies in the Global South. According to Comaroff and 
Comarroff (2012), this is not only because of the contemporary historical events, such 
as the changing geographies of centre-periphery, but also because precisely the 
traditional “ex-centricity” of the Global South makes it a vantage point from which 
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universal issues may be grasped more acutely, both theoretically and empirically 
(p.117). Referring specifically to Africa, they argue that social science needs “Theory 
from the South” to help make sense of phenomena in modern society. Their “Theory 
from the South” differs slightly from Connell’s (2007) “Southern Theory”. By it, they 
mean not theory made by Southerners, or theory simply about the South, but rather, 
“about the effect of the South itself on theory, the effects of its ex-centricity” (2012, 
p. 2). Similarly, even in criminology, including Southern realities is being recognised 
as “not only a question of epistemological justice, but increasingly also an analytical 
imperative and an opportunity for theoretical innovation” (Aas, 2012, p. 16). The 
assumed role of the state is one of the ways in which criminology’s inattention to 
Southern modernities has inhibited theoretical development, and where de-
parochialisation opens up new opportunities (Aas, 2007, 2012). Two criminological 
concepts whose theoretical shortcomings have already been linked to unexamined 
assumptions about the role of the state are social control and deviance.
d. Law, Deviance and Social Control 
Until Stanley Cohen, among others, directed a more critical light on it, ‘social 
control’ was understood mainly as a positive mechanism by which society prevented 
antisocial behaviours such as delinquency, crime and sexual deviance. However, as 
this critical approach to social control became popular, he complained that social 
control had “become somewhat of a Mickey Mouse concept” (Chunn & Gavigan, 
1988, p. 107). As studies “unmask[ed]seemingly benign bureaucratic institutions and 
the medico-legal professions as social control multiplied into a tedious repetition” 
(Chunn & Gavigan, 1988, p. 112), the concept was reduced to a way of discrediting 
any state action, and thereby lost its analytical value. 
Social control’s twin concept, deviance, was also debunked for lack of analytical 
precision in the 1980s. Deviance is dead as a concept, claimed Sumner, the moment 
we realise that what the phenomena we study as deviance have in common is no 
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inherent quality, but merely the fact that they each break some rule created by people 
in power (Sumner, 1994). To examine drug use, delinquency and cross-dressing for 
causal explanations of deviance is to side blindly with the state, he claims, since it 
requires a naturalization of the state’s labelling of these disparate phenomena as 
‘deviance’.
Sumner’s obituary sparked a debate about what, if anything, could be salvaged from 
the “death of deviance” (Ben-Yehuda, 2006; Konty, 2006; Marshall, Douglas, & 
McDonnell, 2006). Konty (2006) suggests a return to Becker’s (1966) original 
definition of deviance as a methodological one: we can tell what behaviour is deviant 
by observing what people treat as deviant. Ben-Yehuda (2006) recommends using 
deviance in tandem with social control, focusing on morality and power as the key 
ingredients of both.  
The use of social control as a “Mickey Mouse concept” that could portray any action 
of the state as social control, reflects a certain unreflexive fixation with the state that 
overrode engagement with the concept’s analytical meaning. Investigating the 
‘deviance’ of certain behaviours requires a similarly unreflexive understanding of the 
state’s labelling of those behaviours as ‘deviant’. Against this background, I choose 
to decouple the concepts from the state, by focusing on power and ideas of right and 
wrong without fixing an assumed role of the state. I also heed Konty’s (2006) 
methodological advice, and treat what people treat as deviant as data to be analysed.
While Sumner declared deviance a defunct object of study once we see the rules as 
simply the creation of people in power, I use ‘deviance’ precisely because of that: for 
what the rules reveal about power (Adler & Adler, 2006). In using the terms social 
control and deviance, I do not to assume that rules are agreed on with full and free 
consent; rather, I use the concepts to examine relations between community norms 
and coercion. I use ‘deviance’ as Marshall et al. (2007) reconceptualise it: “behavior 
that breaks a rule within a social group and is labelled with disapproval” (p. 218). 
Understanding deviance not as explanation but rather as an instance of rule-breaking 
allows us to examine “what rules are broken, according to whom” (Ibid., p. 80). A 
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study of deviance and social control is then a study of who rules. I define social 
control as an effort to enforce a shared rule in response to a perceived violation of this 
rule.
If deviance is not defined by official rules, but rather by what participants perceive as 
deviance, then law-abiding behaviour may be deviant, and criminal behaviour may be 
social control. Most of the studies that take the decoupling of the state to this 
conclusion draw on Donald Black’s (1983) theory of “Crime as Social Control”. He 
posits that behaviour deemed crime by state law is sometimes in itself an effort to 
define or respond to someone else’s conduct as deviant. Such studies have presented 
not only vigilantism (Weisburd, 1988), but also acts as diverse as genocide 
(Campbell, 2009) and suicide (Manning, 2012), as forms of self-help by citizens who 
enforce rules when the state does not. 
While the ‘death of deviance’ debate challenged criminology’s state alignment, legal 
pluralism challenged ‘state centralism’ in legal theory and socio-legal studies. Legal 
pluralists critiqued the presumption that the state was the sole contributor to social 
order through law and had monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Twining, 2009b). 
They drew on Tanzania and other post-colonies for examples of the wealth of ‘other’ 
laws, primarily in customary law. As with studies of social control and deviance, the 
retrospective reckoning of this scholarship has revealed a number of problems with 
legal pluralism (Melissaris, 2004, 2013; Tamanaha, 1995, 2008; Twining, 2009a, 
2009b). My four main concerns, among those raised in this literature, are as follows. 
First, there was continuous slippage from descriptive to normative, an idealization of 
legal pluralism, with several writers prescribing the informalist ideas (Melissaris, 
2013; Twining, 2009b). This problem was further compounded by a second issue: the 
inattention to how Customary Law was an invention for the purposes of colonial 
governance, and very much a reflection of power dynamics (Tamanaha, 2008; 
Twining, 2009b). I describe the shape this took in Tanzania in Section 2D. Thirdly, 
legal pluralism remained largely statist in character, in that it focused on what was 
formalized as Customary Law and how that related to state law (Melissaris, 2013; 
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Tamanaha, 2008; Twining, 2009b). Finally, the question of what law is remained 
unanswered, with critics asking whether decoupling law from the state did not mean 
that we had to treat all social control as law (Melissaris, 2013; Tamanaha, 2008; 
Twining, 2009b). 
One conclusion drawn from this reckoning is that legal pluralism is more valuable as 
a radicalization of the way of thinking about the law than as a legal theory 
(Melissaris, 2013). Law can be studied as discourses that are reduced to binary 
schema of legal/illegal, allowed/prohibited, rather than as structure. Seen through 
such a “normative pluralist” lens, formal state law is only one of many forms of 
social practice concerned with ordering relations between persons (Twining, 2009b). 
Alongside it, many informal normative orders exist which also maintain social order 
within a group. Law, then, is defined as what people in a social group label as law—
or, more precisely, what they see as common shared norms of interaction that 
everyone should comply with and that should be enforced by sanctions and 
punishments (Tamanaha, 2008). This makes it possible to identify norms by their 
social control and regulative functions regardless of their relationship to the state
legal apparatus.
The re-conceptualisations that emerge from the appraisals of each of these two 
separate fields—deviance and social control on the one hand, and legal pluralism on 
the other—point in a common direction. Normative pluralists acknowledge that their 
approach might also be called pluralism in social control, since it encompasses most 
forms of social control (Griffiths, 2003; Tamanaha, 2008; Twining, 2009b). What the 
actors themselves see as law and deviance in their group has become the central 
starting point to both fields. It is data on this that I present in this thesis. 
The definition of law used in this study, then, will be one from the revised social 
control and deviance literature that is compatible with normative pluralism, namely 
“a system of rules with a regime of punishments attached to ensure compliance, 
where the sanction attached makes people obey” (Marshall et al., 2006, p. 88). It may 
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be informal, and it may or may not involve the government, but people understand it 
as commonly shared rules worthy of enforcement.  
Law and social control in Africa 
The decoupling of law, social control and deviance from the state increases the 
concepts’ affordances for understanding African empirical realities. Within African 
Studies, political scientists and historians have documented a considerable grey area 
between state social control and individual deviance, in which a variety of non-state 
actors enforce law and order.
We need a basic awareness of the historical role and political nature of this grey area 
if we are to understand how social control and deviance play out in Tanzania. One 
common approach that lacks such an awareness, and thus illustrates its importance, is 
that which links colonialism to crime in Africa by claiming that colonialism 
weakened norm enforcement at the community and family level by disrupting 
African structures and replacing them with alien institutions (Arthur, 1991; 1997; 
Stamatel, 2009; Sumner, 1982). The good intentions of this approach resemble those 
of Christie’s: it seeks to avoid colluding with colonialism by siding with traditional 
African community norms against “Western” state institutions. 
A brief look at the historical role and political nature of the grey area of non-state 
norm enforcement in East Africa reveals that the entities this approach supports are 
not in fact counterweights to colonialism, but rather agents who were deeply 
embroiled in the colonial endeavour. Colonial powers controlled their subjects 
through indirect rule, which meant that social control and norm enforcement by non-
state actors was in itself a strategy of colonial rule. Colonial rule was enacted through 
intermediaries presented as “traditional African” institutions. The social control 
mechanisms of institutions such as family, tribe, community and chiefdom were 
strengthened during colonial times for the purposes of colonial rule.
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The “African institutions” that post-colonial states inherited, then, were those which 
had served the colonial strategy of indirect rule. Post-colonial states largely continued 
this strategy of rule by intermediaries, maintaining social order through a multiplicity 
of social control agents (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2008, 2010; Bagayoko, 2012).
This post-colonial continuation of colonial strategies, of ruling by proxy and relying 
on more or less invented ‘traditional’ actors to maintain law and order rather than 
seeking a monopoly on law enforcement, is typical of the bifurcated African state 
(Abrahamsen & Williams, 2008, 2010; Mamdani, 1996). 
Rather than being undermined by colonial governance, then, social control at the 
level of local communities and families formed part of colonial and post-colonial 
governance. Customary law was a colonial invention, and community norm 
enforcement in general was at the heart of indirect rule, imbued with considerable 
power by colonial and post-colonial regimes (Lovett, 1996; Mbilinyi, 1988; 
Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). Studies of normative pluralism in Africa show how 
colonial rulers strategically left indigenous norm enforcement on the community and 
family level largely alone, and enforced pre-existing agents of social control there 
more often than they abolished them. Where they did introduce transplanted state 
law, it was never effective in dictating everyday social life, nor did they ever intend it 
to be (Tamanaha, 2008). Both during and after colonial rule, behaviour at this level 
has often been governed by community norms, and state law has been largely 
impotent (Tamanaha, 2008). Some Africanist scholars even go so far as to claim that 
the historical and foundational social contract for most Africans is not between the 
state and individuals, but between communities and individuals (Leonard, 2013). 
The balance of power between formal state law and informal community norms in 
Africa differs, then, both from the ‘modern’ states with which criminologists are 
more familiar, and from the Africa they have imagined. Like Christie’s (1977) 
community-owned court case, presided over by Party Secretaries who took a back 
seat, the community in the bifurcated African state enforces its norms with the 
blessing of the state, not in competition with it. We can only see community norms as 
the opposite of colonialism if we are unaware of the dynamics of collusion, 
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compromise and power-sharing at the centre of colonial governance. Sustained 
colonial rule was not a product of force alone: it was also a negotiated compromise 
between coloniser and colonised.  
This is particularly important in relation to gender. As African feminists have pointed 
out, the compromise between colonizing and colonized from which institutions of 
colonial and post-colonial control derive, was negotiated between men at the expense 
of colonised women (Manji, 1999; Mbilinyi, 1988; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). 
Studies of the legal pluralism that resulted have shown how the realms relegated to 
customary law, namely the realms of community and family, are the same realms 
which most affect women’s everyday lives, to a greater extent than men’s (Manji, 
1999). In addition, the lens of normative pluralism allows us to see that this insight 
applies not only to the norms formalised by the colonial and post-colonial state 
through Customary Law, but also to the enforcement in these realms of community 
norms whose sanctioning by the state is not formalized with the official label ‘law’.
The community and family institutions that were vested with norm-enforcing power, 
whether formal or informal, by the colonial compromise, were the institutions 
through which men controlled “their” women (Lovett, 1996; Manji, 1999; Whitehead 
& Tsikata, 2003). 
This characteristic of African colonial history in general has been confirmed in 
historical accounts from colonial Tanzania (then Tanganyika) in particular. Lovett 
(1996), for instance, has shown how men who supplied the colonial economy with 
migrant labour could in return count on the colonial regime to support their 
community’s control over their wives, with specific reference to one of the regions 
(Buha, now Kigoma) studied here. On a national level, Mbilinyi has shown how the 
colonial state made strenuous efforts to keep women forcibly subjugated to their 
husbands (Mbilinyi, 1988), and how such colonial strategies to control women not 
only endured in the post-colonial period, but were revitalized then (Mbilinyi, 1997). 
Ivaska (2002) has shown how official authorities in post-colonial Tanzania appealed 
to the unofficial enforcement of community-level norms to control women.
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Against this background, it is not surprising that a women’s rights lawyer I spoke 
with in Tanzania claimed that it was not the alien institutions that colonialists 
imposed that harmed women the most, but rather the community norm enforcement 
mechanisms that they invented and reinforced6. Studies that take as their starting 
point women’s everyday lives to see what colonial and post-colonial regulation most 
affects women, find that state law intervenes very little in East African women’s 
lives, and is often less powerful than informal community norms. For instance, most 
cases where women claim state law is broken, are never judged by state law, but are 
settled instead according to informal community norms (Manji, 1999). 
A closer look at the historical role and political nature of the grey area between state 
social control and individual deviance, then, shows that the non-state enforcement of 
community norms in Africa was vested with power by colonial and post-colonial 
regimes, and played a key role in securing a particular political order between 
colonisers and colonized, and between men and women. Community norms and their 
enforcement are not outside politics. Rather, just as the debates over deviance and 
social control have shown formal law to be about who rules, community norms and 
their enforcement are no less political. 
e. Violence and social order 
When the bifurcated African state shares power with a multiplicity of social control 
agents, it also shares the right to the legitimate use of force (Abrahamsen & Williams, 
2008; Bagayoko, 2012; Leopold, 2005). As Ebo (2007) points out, “the postcolonial 
African state has hardly had a monopoly of legitimate force at any point in time” (p. 
38). When such non-state actors use violence against citizens, then, they are not 
usurping the state’s prerogative, but rather carrying out responsibilities the state has 
shared with them as intermediaries. Their violence, then, is not deviance from the 
                                              
6 Personal interview with a lawyer in an organization giving legal assistance to women, Dar Es Salaam, August 2006. 
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social order. On the contrary, it maintains and enforces the prevailing social order. 
This non-state violence is social control, and as such, reflects who rules.
Tanzania features prominently in the literature on African rural communities engaged 
in such “private” violence to maintain law and order (Cleaver, Franks, Maganga, & 
Hall, 2013; Kelsall, 2003; Miguel, 2005; Tanner, 2010). Community responses to 
cattle-rustling, for instance, the so-called SunguSungu, have attracted considerable 
attention from Western researchers (e.g., Abrahams, 1987; Bukurura, 1994, 1995; 
Fleisher, 2000; Heald, 2002, 2006; Paciotti & Borgerhoff Mulder, 2004; Paciotti & 
Hadley, 2004; Weisburd, 1988). Scholars classify it as vigilantism or community-up 
policing, thus acknowledging it as “actions taken to control behavior deemed to be 
deviant, outside the purview of the official justice system” (Fleisher, 2000, p. 209). In 
other words, this “private” violence is norm-enforcing: a form of social control. 
Moreover, the violence of the SunguSungu is neither on behalf of the state nor 
rejected by the state (Heald, 2007). This non-state actor’s use of violence to maintain 
social order on the local level is tolerated by the state insofar as the order it maintains 
is compatible with that of the state. In this sense, it instantiates the post-colonial 
strategy of states ruling by proxy instead of seeking monopoly on legitimate violence. 
Pertinent to my research is the hitherto-uninvestigated question of whether wife-
beating plays a similar role. 
What is the sociological importance of such African cases where order is maintained 
by non-state actors’ use of force? According to traditional understandings of the 
scope of the discipline, the answer is ‘not much’. The founding fathers conceived of 
sociology as the study of modern society, and built on, rather than challenged, the 
prevailing Westphalian understanding of the modern state as that in which the use of 
violence by non-state actors to enforce social order was delegitimised—that is, where 
the state sought monopoly on legitimately ordering violence. Thus, empirical 
examples from Africa of non-state actors using legitimately ordering violence simply 
confirm that African societies lack the key characteristic to be studied as modern 
societies, and are thus outside the scope of sociological theory.  
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As long as African cases of legitimate uses of ordering violence by non-state actors 
are interpreted as locating Africa outside of social theory, such cases cannot be used 
to speak to social theory on the relation between violence and social order. 
Sociologists of violence in “Western” societies, however, are increasingly calling for 
a re-examination of how violence relates to social order (Walby, 2013). Ray (2011), 
for instance, in reviewing the scholarship on the role of violence in social order, 
claims that social theory has neglected the ordering role of violence. What this 
critique amounts to is the claim that even in supposedly “modern” societies, ordering 
violence takes many more forms than law enforcement by state actors; thus the 
violence-order nexus cannot be reduced to a simple division of the state’s legitimate 
violence as the use of force for law and order on the one hand, and the delegitimised 
violence of citizens as deviance from the social order, if not rebellion against it, on 
the other (Ray, 2011). Walby (2013), for instance, interprets the fact that violence 
against women and ethnic minorities was never fully outlawed in the UK and US as 
signifying that even in these quintessentially “modern” societies, the state “shared the 
monopoly on violence with racists and misogynists” who used it to enforce racial and 
gender orders (p. 100). On this basis, she points out, we can question whether any 
society has ever qualified as “modern” by these criteria. 
Questioning the grounds on which ordering violence has been equated with state 
violence undermines entrenched perceptions not only of divisions between modern 
and non-modern, but also of the opposition between violence and social order. The 
re-conceptualization that this makes possible, claims Walby (2013), is a more 
accurate one, in that most violence is perpetrated by the more powerful against the 
less powerful, and thus does not fit the image of the underdog’s revolt against the 
social order. While individuals’ violence has been studied as an outcome of social 
order, this re-conceptualisation demands that we also look at how violence constitutes
social order. 
Ray (2011) highlights feminist research on violence against women as the exception 
to the general scholarly neglect of the order-violence nexus, and Hearn (2013) points 
to domestic violence research in particular as a promising arena for developing 
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sociological theory on how violence actually relates to social order. One example of 
this is how feminist research on domestic violence in rural North American 
communities has challenged the collective efficacy/social disorganization theory of 
crime. According to this theory, crime signifies a breakdown in social order: the 
community lacks ‘efficacy’ in social control, and is not organized enough to mobilise 
its shared norms against violations of those norms (Sampson, 2008). Rural 
communities are presented as particularly high in collective efficacy and thus low in 
crime. As critics have pointed out, however, this assumes that the community’s 
norms that are enforced coincide with official criminal law, and that violations of 
them thus coincide with violations of criminal law, i.e., “crime” (Barclay, 
Donnermeyer, & Jobes, 2004). Collective efficacy may prevent some crimes, 
explains rural criminologist Donnermeyer (2012), while facilitating other crimes: it 
all depends on what these shared norms are that the community is efficacious in 
mobilising. DeKeseredy and Schwartz’ (2009) research on communities with strong 
collective efficacy shows domestic violence as illustrative of this. Men’s violence 
against their wives did not signify a breakdown in social order, or a failure in 
collective efficacy. Rather, the violence was facilitated by the community’s 
mobilization of shared norms. Thus domestic violence shows the following. Insofar 
as a community’s norms concern ideals of what the social order should look like, 
whether a particular form of violence is facilitated or prevented by those norms 
depends on its compatibility with the social order they prescribe. In other words, 
rather than being a sign that the community was unable to enforce social order, 
tolerated domestic violence was violence that was compatible with the particular 
social order prescribed in that community.
The idea of domestic violence as the social control of women in modern society 
challenges the assumed antithesis between individuals’ violence and social order that 
is supposed to distinguish contemporary Western societies from African ones. 
However, in the literature on social control and deviance, studies of the social control 
of women in modern societies rarely analyse domestic violence as a form of this, but 
focus instead on the scientific ‘management’ of women by state bureaucracies and the 
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medico-legal professions. In this they reflect the debunked understandings of social 
control and violence described in Section 2D of this thesis, whereby individual 
violence is deviance, and the agents of social control are large formal institutions. 
One exception is Gagné’s (1992) ethnography of impoverished communities in rural 
Appalachia, which analyses husbands’ violence against their wives as social control.  
Nevertheless, thanks to the increasing recognition that the antithesis between 
individuals’ violence and social order does not hold even in the most ‘modern’ 
societies, the ordering nature of non-state violence can finally be analysed 
sociologically, rather than just used as a contrasting illustration of what is outside the 
scope of sociological inquiry. In other words, the findings presented in Article 3, of 
how wife-beating is legitimised on the basis that it constitutes and maintains a certain 
social order, can contribute to social theory, and more specifically, “theory from the 
South”, as the Comaroffs (2012) call it.
f. A Gramscian approach to community norms  
How can concepts derived from Antonio Gramsci’s work help to make sense of how 
people talk about wife-beating in Tanzania? Gramsci’s theory of hegemony deals 
with the roles power, violence and norms play in relation to one another, and thus 
seems a promising framework for understanding what norms surrounding VAW 
reveal about power relations. However, Antonio Gramsci theorized hegemony to 
make sense of the communist party’s difficulty in overturning unequal class relations 
at a specific historical moment in history. Thus the power he speaks of is that of the 
state, civil society and the bourgeoisie, not men’s power over women, and the 
violence is that of the state and the political classes, not that of husbands against 
wives. My choice to deploy Gramscian hegemonic theory to analyse how people talk 
about wife-beating in Tanzania thus involves some adaptation. Fortunately, as Stuart 
Hall (1986) pointed out in using Gramsci’s analysis of class relations to analyse race 
relations, this way of adapting and extending Gramsci’s notions in order to make 
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them speak to current social questions is in itself a continuation of Gramsci’s own 
approach to social analysis. I will therefore use his notions of hegemony, consent, 
coercion and common sense as they account for the stability not of class relations, but 
of gender relations. This has proved a fruitful interpretation in social science (e.g., 
Cockburn & Ormrod, 1993; Connell, 1987; Gottfried, 1998; Hearn, 2004; Ridgeway 
& Correll, 2004). 
The basic notion of hegemony that I draw from Gramsci’s work (Gramsci, Hoare, & 
Nowell-Smith, 1971) and interpretations of his work (Bates, 1975; Jones, 2007; 
Liguori, 2009; Ludwig, 2009; Stoddart, 2007) is as follows. Hegemony is a form of 
domination of one social group by another, where the dominated consent to their 
domination despite the fact that it disadvantages them. This is achieved by a 
combination of consent and coercion, which also depend on one another. The 
‘common sense’ among the dominated has incorporated the ideas by which they are 
dominated.
Gramsci distinguishes between hegemony and domination based on force alone, 
referring to the latter as ‘simple dictatorship’ (Bates, 1975). Through hegemonic 
processes, most people in a given society come to accept the practices that ensure that 
one group dominates over another as a given, even as desirable. In absolute 
hegemony, then, domination requires no use of force at all. However, Gramsci does 
not treat hegemony as a fixed state of completion, but rather as a dynamic process in 
which coercion plays specific roles. When applied to data on the meaning people give 
to wife-beating, then, hegemonic theory could aid in understanding the role violence 
against women plays in the domination of women. This role is debated, as I explain 
in Section 2B. In particular, his theorisation of consent and consensus within
domination, and indeed as a prerequisite for successful hegemonic domination, 
addresses the otherwise puzzling fact that such violence against women is in fact 
supported by most women, as surveys show (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). In 
presenting his theory, I will now highlight the parts I draw on before summarising 
how these resonate with my research. 
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Consent and coercion operate as one 
 While liberal theory assumes one excludes the other, hegemony is achieved as 
consent and coercion operate in tandem. Coercion works best when the subaltern 
consents to ’legitimate’ forms of coercion, and the possibility of coercion maintains 
consent. So closely do the two re-enforce one another that they are in fact indivisible: 
the distinction between them is only an analytical one, suggests Gramsci, in order to 
think about two specific ways of exercising power (Ludwig, 2009). He likens 
hegemony to a centaur in order to illustrate the indivisibility of coercion and consent 
in a situation of hegemony. Like the man and the beast in the centaur, coercion and 
consent, when combined in hegemony, are not two discrete entities, but rather merge 
into one, and operate as one. 
Shared social norms are crucial in hegemony 
What role does this give community norms? Ordinary people’ worldviews and ideas 
of right and wrong are central to consent. On a group level, hegemonic consensus is 
achieved when the idea that the social order of domination is right and proper, and for 
the good of everyone, is incorporated into the worldview shared across a social 
group. The dominant group cannot simply impose these ideas onto the social group, 
but must make social and ideational compromises to win their consent and achieve 
hegemonic consensus, and must continue to do so. The manufacture and maintenance 
of consent is continuous. 
Gramsci speaks of the worldview into which these hegemonic ideas must be 
incorporated, as the realm of “common sense”. The “common sense” of a social 
group is the implicit conception of life and morals most widespread within a social 
group in one particular place and time, ‘common’ in the sense of a low common 
denominator. While Gramsci described ‘common sense’ disapprovingly, as the most 
primordial level of ideology, he insisted that all social strata had a ‘common sense’ 
guiding the everyday lives of individuals within it, and that in this way we are all 
“conformists of some conformism” (Gramsci et al., 1971, p. 324). As Liguori finds in 
his examination of references to ”common sense” across Gramsci’s notebooks, 
common sense is conservative, traditionalist, and resistant to innovation, “stuck in the 
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idea of objective and never-changing truths”: in short, an obstacle to social 
transformation (Liguori, 2009, p. 126). Nevertheless, insists Gramsci, engaging with
the realm of common sense is crucial for both making and breaking hegemony. 
Achieving hegemony requires making sure “common sense” contains an endorsement 
of the order of domination. Once hegemony is achieved, subalterns cannot challenge 
it without breaking with the “common sense” of their subaltern group (Liguori, 
2009). In any struggle over hegemony, then, the battle over “common sense” is an 
inevitable and decisive one. It is from this realm of “common sense” that my data are 
drawn. 
Violence on standby coerces consent 
In a hegemonic state, the presence of hegemonic norms within “common sense” is 
enough to ensure the conformity of most people most of the time. The coercive 
apparatus is thus merely kept on standby, for moments of declining consent, or for 
individuals who deviate from the norm (Bates, 1975; Stoddart, 2007). However the 
fact that violence is kept in the wings does not diminish its role, since the effect of 
coercion is not limited to the “moments of force” in which it is actually used. As 
Atack (2006) points out, although it is only applied in marginal, deviant cases, 
coercion is always latent in hegemony. Although the self-governing individual who 
can govern himself outside of the actual ”moment of force” is the ideal of hegemony, 
the apparatus to carry out violence in this “moment of force” is “constructed for all 
society in anticipation of moments of crisis in command…when spontaneous 
consensus declines” (cited in Bates, 1975, p. 353) .  
Consent makes coercion look freely chosen 
Both the achievement of a hegemonic consensus through the subalterns’ endorsement 
of norms that supported domination, and the coercive effect of the violence waiting 
latent in the wings, rely on coercion and consent working in tandem and reinforcing 
one another. While the threat of force coerces consent, consent makes coercion look 
like freedom. In Gramsci’s words, obtaining subalterns’ “consent and collaboration… 
turn(s) necessity and coercion into freedom” (cited in Ludwig, 2009, p. 98). This 
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mutually reinforcing dynamic between violence and widely shared, apparently 
“freely” endorsed, norms is another dimension I will look for in the data. 
Ideas exist alongside material realities 
Gramsci’s focus on how the consensus around hegemonic truths enables the 
reproduction of domination is an emphasis on the role of ideas in structures of 
inequality. However, this emphasis on the role of ideas in shaping behaviour is not a 
denial of the significance of material realities in these same processes. He emphasises 
that “ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing 
one another, but not reducible one to the other”(cited in Atack, 2006, p. 94) His 
development of the concept of hegemony, however, was a critique of what he saw as 
the reduction of ideas to material conditions in the “economistic” theories that 
dominated the left at the time (Ludwig, 2009). He argued that if, at one historical 
moment, the socio-political order did take a form that corresponded to the economic 
requirements of the mode of production specific to that same historical moment, then 
this correspondence was not automatic. Rather, it was as dominant groups led 
subalterns, through hegemonic processes, to ‘choose’ what was in the dominant 
group’s interests, that economic requirements were met (Ludwig, 2009). 
Relating hegemonic theory to this research  
Hegemonic theory resonates with my data and research questions in several ways. 
The type of data corresponds closely to the realm of common sense, which is a 
crucial site for the struggle for hegemony. Secondly, hegemony theorises the 
relationship between the elements that make up the topic of the research: violence, 
consent and domination. In particular, it offers some ways of thinking around the 
puzzle that is women’s consent to violence against them. Thirdly, the fact that the 
theory acknowledges both material reality and the importance of ideas, yet offers a 
counterweight to economic reductionism, is particularly relevant to understanding 
violence against women in a context of material poverty. Lastly, framing what 
research respondents say as ‘common sense’, allows me to place them on equal 
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footing with any other social group, since each has its ‘common sense’, to which “we 
are all conformists” (cited in Jones, 2007, p. 48).  
The conceptualisations I use of social control, deviance and law are also improved by 
relating them to Gramscian notions of hegemony. Doing so yields a more complex 
understanding of the point that ‘rules are created by people in power’, namely that 
hegemony is enabled when norms that serve the domination of one group by another 
are incorporated within the realm of ‘common sense’ (the worldview shared across a 
social group). Insofar as violence is an effort to enforce a shared rule, and thus ‘social 
control’, violence is also hegemonic coercion.  
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3. Methodology 
a. Consultation with Tanzanian researchers and activists 
Before I began my fieldwork, I spent some weeks in the capital, Dar Es Salaam, 
waiting for my research permit. I used this time to connect with researchers, activists 
and others working on gender and violence issues at NGOs, think tanks and the 
University of Dar Es Salaam. Speaking with them, and reading the grey literature I 
found through them, gave me an idea of the general state of knowledge on the topic. I 
also asked for their opinion on my research project. 
This consultation informed my decisions throughout the project. Two of the reactions 
I met with as a young white woman there to study ‘violence against women’ had a 
particularly strong influence on my decisions. Both were reactions of dismay and 
contempt. The first was from a female academic, who sardonically remarked how 
people come from Europe to do research in Tanzania, and yet after lots of fieldwork, 
taking lots of people’s time, all they go back to write about is themselves. She said it 
seemed like it was all just about self-discovery, and asked whether research in 
Tanzania could not be about Tanzania. The second reaction was the expectation I met 
in many governmental and non-governmental offices that the violence I was 
interested in was the culture-specific practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). “I 
know. You mean FGM,” was a typical reaction, in a tone that communicated how 
predictable people like me were. It sometimes took a while to convince them that I 
really was interested in ‘just beating’. 
The insights I gained and the contacts I made through this consultation also shaped 
my analysis. Several years later, when I came across controversial research 
publications (notably, the article I critique in Section 2C), I shared it with some of the 
people whose advice I had first sought in 2007, and asked what they thought. The 
same networks have helped me to share the first two articles in this thesis with 
policy-makers and activists. 
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b. Data Generation 
i. Why Focus Group Discussions? 
Michelle Fine (1989) has problematized the particular consequences individualistic 
research methods have in the field of violence against women. I wanted to look for 
answers to my research question not ‘inside the bodies and minds’ of individual 
women, but instead in the shared social norms that she says individualistic methods 
vindicate (p. 551).
Bloor et al. (2001) argue that for data on shared social norms, the Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) method “should be the sociological method of choice, providing 
concentrated and detailed information on an area of group life which is only 
occasionally, briefly and allusively available to the ethnographer over months and 
months of fieldwork” (p. 6). I was not interested in which positions people took on 
wife-beating, but rather in the ways in which they argued for those positions. As 
‘sceptical enthusiasts’ of the method emphasise, while questions of which points of 
view people hold are better answered with surveys (such as the Demographic and 
Health Survey), “focus groups are better for exploring how points of view are 
constructed and expressed” (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999, p. 5).  
I also hoped the method would help mitigate some of the problems related to my 
positionality. I did not believe people would be able to have a relaxed or even 
remotely normal conversation with someone of my conspicuous whiteness and 
privilege. I anticipated any interview with someone like me to say more about how 
respondents saw me than about how they saw wife-beating. I did not want to waste 
people’s time getting data that I could only use to say something about me, and how 
people saw me. I agreed with the criticism of this that I had received from the female 
academic in Dar Es Salaam. Focus group discussions offered a way to get data on 
what people said to one another instead of to me. The method is said to offer ways of 
shifting power and attention away from the researcher and over to fellow participants 
(Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999; Bloor et al., 2001; Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2013; 
Puchta & Potter, 2004).
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ii. Site selection and sampling 
Insofar as violence against women is seen in a negative light, it is presented in public 
discourse as something ‘others’ do—in Tanzania as in other societies. The precise 
dimensions along which the violence is distanced from ‘us’, however, differ from 
society to society. For example, in some European countries, violence against women 
is perceived as particularly prevalent among Roma communities. It is important to 
bear the specific ‘distancing dimensions’ in mind when sampling, because they can 
be used to invalidate research results. For example, if membership in a Roma 
community were a distancing dimension in Hungary, then regardless of whether 
Roma communities actually did have higher rates of VAW than the Hungarian 
average, findings from a Hungarian study could easily be discounted in Hungarian 
popular opinion if most of the respondents were found to be from Roma 
communities.
I had already heard several ‘othering’ strategies in Tanzania by which people 
distanced their own group from VAW. I had often heard, for instance, that people in 
the deep countryside were more traditional and therefore more violent to women. 
Meanwhile, in the countryside, I heard that people in the big cities lost their bearings 
under modern Western influences, went running after money, and ended up beating 
women for no good reason. Also between Muslims and Christians, educated and less 
educated, rich and poor, this blame shifting was often mutual: each group placed 
VAW with the other. The only othering I did not hear reversed was the idea that 
Masaai peoples are more violent to women. 
My sampling and site selection aimed not to disprove any of these popular theories, 
but to make sure my findings could not be discounted by any of them, regardless of 
their validity. I thus made choices so that my respondents could not be placed easily 
in one or the other of these groups, and my findings written off as merely 
characterising an otherised group. The result is that the respondents represent a cross-
section of Tanzanian society as regards VAW differences. 
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As a midway between deep countryside and inner city, I chose villages within a day’s 
travel from a regional capital. I chose two regions from opposite ends of the national 
continuum as regards socio-economic indicators and “Western” or “modernising” 
influence. I chose the first, Kigoma, because it was a region I was familiar with, but 
also because it is one of the least researched and least accessible regions. I chose the 
second, Arusha region, because of its position at the other end of the socio-economic 
spectrum, and because it is one of the best known to Western researchers. I chose one 
district in each region with villages within a day’s travel of the region capital: 
Arumeru district near Arusha town, and Kigoma-Vijijini district near Kigoma town.
Kigoma is situated in the Westernmost part of the country, on Lake Tanganyika, 
which forms the border with Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. It is the region the furthest 
away from the country’s commercial capital, Dar Es Salaam, and its capital has 
historically been the least connected to national infrastructure and socio-economic 
development. Ha (or Buha) is the main ethnic group, and formed, in precolonial 
times, part of the Interlacustrine Kingdom that included most of Rwanda and 
Burundi. Due to cross-border trade and migration, a small minority of Kigoma 
residents are of Burundian and Congolese descent. Formerly a station on the Swahili 
trade route, Kigoma has a strong Muslim heritage, and the Kigoma-Vijijini district 
includes both Muslim and Christian residents.  
Arusha region, by contrast, is a region with a strong missionary and therefore 
Christian heritage. Home to some of the first European-style schools and hospitals, as 
well as to a large proportion of the white settlers, it has been at the forefront of 
political and economic developments in both colonial and post-colonial times. It is 
currently a hub for two major industries, tourism and agribusiness. The regional 
capital, Arusha, is within a day’s drive of both Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi. Its airport, 
the nation’s second largest, places it within daily reach of European capitals. The 
villages in Arumeru district, then, although no closer to town than those in Kigoma-
Vijijini, are more exposed to foreign and/or modern influence than similar villages 
elsewhere in the country. The main ethnic groups in Arumeru district are Arusha and 
Meru, with Arusha forming part of the larger Nilotic group popularly known as the 
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Maasai. Most district residents are Christian or animalist in their religious practice, 
with Muslims a considerable minority. 
In each of these two districts, I chose ten villages. In Kigoma, choosing villages 
within a day’s drive from town meant that I excluded lakeside villages without road 
access which were within a day’s boatride from town. In Arumeru, I excluded 
Masaai villages that served as ethnotouristic destinations for visitors who wanted to 
see a “Maasai homestead”. Within these limitations, I made sure that the ten villages I 
chose in each district covered the main lines of diversity in that district. 
iii. Recruitment and selection of participants 
I followed the official procedure for research access as set up by the Tanzanian 
government. After I had applied for and been granted access first at national, then at 
regional and district level, the district commissioner in each district wrote me a letter 
of recommendation to give to the officer of each of my chosen villages. When I went 
with this to each village office, the village officer invariably offered to help me in 
gathering my respondents. I had only to say my time and place, and whom I wished 
to meet. I accepted this offer, and gave my specifications. 
Is this form of recruitment ethical? Does it not bias my findings? These were two 
concerns that initially made me hesitate in accepting this offer of assistance. In terms 
of ethics, how could I be sure that the “voluntary” nature of participation was real, if 
my respondents had been ordered to participate by a superior, on my behalf? In terms 
of bias, how could I be sure the officer had not deliberately biased my findings by 
carefully selecting respondents who would only say what he wanted me to hear?  
I dealt with my concern over voluntary participation as follows (beyond, of course, 
telling the officer that participation was voluntary). I told the officer he did not need 
to be there himself for the meeting. When the meeting started, I thanked everyone for 
coming, and made it clear that all I had asked of the officer was to get a chance to 
meet them to ask them a favour. Once I had asked them, whoever wanted to leave, 
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could leave, and I would keep no record of who stayed or left. My question was 
whether any of them would be willing to sit there and discuss for one to two hours. In 
this way, if the participants had not showed up to the meeting voluntarily, they could 
choose whether to stay for the Focus Group Discussion or not. One to three people 
out of ten to twelve typically left at this point. 
After having conducted a few discussions like this, I decided my concern about the 
village officer biasing my findings though his recruitment decisions was exaggerated. 
Typically, the offer of assistance was a disinterested one: a standard dutiful response 
to the letter from his superior asking him to assist me. Moreover, even if, for some 
reason, officers across several villages tried to bias my sample in the same direction, 
and also succeeded (which was improbable), this bias would not automatically 
transfer onto the subsequent stages in the method  - the data generated and the 
implications drawn from them – in the way they would in a quantitative study.  
iv. Group composition 
Returning, then, to the point where the village officer asked me whom I wished to 
meet with:  I explained that I wanted to meet with one group of men and one group of 
women, and that I would want each group to discuss amongst themselves. I would 
then ask for a specific group of men or women, for example younger men, or 
wealthier women. Sometimes I would ask instead what the main lines of division 
were in that village, what type of women would speak more freely to one another. 
Sometimes this resulted in my meeting with a pre-existing group, such as a women’s 
cooperative, and young men who played football together. In one village, the officer 
suggested I segment men by age as there had been specific intergenerational tension 
in the past year, and this might be distracting if I set up a discussion with old and 
young men together. 
Within each village, I met with one group of women and one group of men. Again, I 
made sure the main lines of diversity were covered between the groups, but this did 
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not always mean segmenting groups by each dimension. For example, in some 
villages where both Muslims and Christians lived, the religious diversity was factored 
in through one group with both Muslim and Christian respondents. Moreover, not all 
groups were segmented beyond the male-female segmentation. 
v. Facilitating discussions7
The discussions typically took place in a respondent’s home, or in a communal 
building. There were usually eight to ten respondents, myself as the white female 
researcher, and my male research assistant of Meru ethnicity. 
My first attempts at focus group discussions (FGDs) were a failure, in the sense that 
they did not generate the type of data that I had chosen the method for. They 
generated data on what some people say to a white researcher who asks about wife-
beating, but this was not my research topic. I wanted participants to exchange 
opinions and arguments between themselves about the rights and wrongs of wife-
beating, and experimented with different ways of facilitating the discussions in order 
to make this happen. I saw my undeniable whiteness and all the associations attached 
to it as a hindrance to that. Although I could not pretend that I was not there, or that I 
was not white, I could shift participants’ focus away from me while they spoke, at 
least by removing myself from the visual centre of attention, and setting up activities 
that made participants focus on one another. This is how I ended up facilitating the 
FGDs the way I did: for most of the time, participants discussed among themselves 
with neither me nor my assistant present, and through role-plays and vignettes that 
prompted and guided them into discussing directly with one another. The entire 
discussion was voice recorded with their permission.
The conversation-starters I used consisted of vignettes, role-plays and group debate 
exercises. Although I alternated between role-plays and vignettes, the questions I 
                                              
7 Issues relating to the use of FGDs are more throroughly adressed in Article 1.  
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used these methods to ask remained the same. Across groups, I prompted discussions 
around the following questions. 
• Ayoungerwomancomestotellyoushe’shadenoughofbeingbeaten.Shewantsittostop.
Whatwouldyousay?
• Amantellsyouhebeathiswifeyesterday.Whatmighthetellyou,foryoutochastisehim
aboutit?Whatmighthetellyou,foryoutosayhewasright?
• Amansayshe’llneverbeathiswife.Whatdoyouthinkofthisman?
• Dowomensometimesgetbeatenwithoutdeservingit?
• Canamansometimesberighttobeathiswife?
• Whatshouldonedoifonehearsone’sneighbourbeatinghiswife?
Each of these conversation starters did not spark a lively discussion in every group. 
Sometimes, a group would find one question too similar to the previous one, and ask 
to move on since they had already covered it. Sometimes a question would remain 
unanswered, because the discussion that followed it veered off track, and nobody in 
the group brought it back again. However, for most of the time in most of the 
discussions, discussions were lively and enthusiastic, and I had the impression that 
many participants enjoyed it.
When I wanted the reticent to participate more, or when I wanted disagreement to be 
more clearly voiced, I used specific debate exercises to make the tos and fros of the 
arguments more visible. In a ranking exercise, groups were given cards with various 
scenarios written on them, and asked to rank them in order of good and bad, better 
and worse. Participants moved the cards up and down the scale, explaining their 
reasoning to the others as they did so. In a position placement exercise,  each 
participant, on hearing a vignette, would choose his ‘position’  on the question by 
placing his unique pawn in one of three areas marked “Right”, “Wrong”, and “It 
depends”. In the ensuing discussion, participants could then challenge co-participants 
to defend the position that they had clearly taken, or try to convince them to move 
their pawn to another position.  This often resulted in a game-like atmosphere, where 
getting more people to “join their team” was an incentive for participants to convince 
others of their chosen position on a question.
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According to Ryen (2011), it is by focusing on the hows rather than the whats that 
contemporary qualitative methodology can avoid the “old stereotypes of the 
unfamiliar” for which research methods are critiqued as imperialistic (p.445). The 
point of these discussions was not to learn what each person genuinely believed about 
the issues discussed: this is something FGDs cannot reliably say anything about. Nor 
was I interested in what the group finally decided in the ranking and positioning 
exercises. What I wanted was to hear how the participants argued when they spoke 
with one another about the rights and wrongs of wife-beating, and how they 
interpreted one another’s arguments. When a person was asked by fellow-villagers to 
explain why wife-beating in this case was right or wrong, which lines of reasoning 
did that person choose? Which values or ideals did (s)he appeal to?  Her responses 
reflect her assessment of which argument is most likely to ‘fly’ in the group. Once 
she says it, the group’s response indicates whether it did in fact ‘fly’. I interpret this 
perspicacity, this ability to tell which arguments will ‘fly’ in the group, as an 
awareness of the hegemonic norms in the group. 
vi. Transcription and translation 
The discussions took place in Swahili, with participants sometimes switching into 
their local languages – Kiha, Kimeru or Kiarusha. I asked native Swahili and Kimeru-
speakers to assist in transcribing and the discussions, and sought additional advice 
from Kiha- and Kiarusha-speakers where there were significant discussions 
conducted in those languages. 
c. Ethics 
I obtained official permission to conduct this research in Tanzania through the 
Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) in Dar Es Salaam, and 
subsequently from the Arusha and Kigoma Regional Offices, the District Offices of 
Arumeru and Kigoma-Vijijini, and from each village office. 
In addition to the normal procedure of explaining that participation was voluntary, I 
gave the recruited participants the opportunity to leave before the discussion and at 
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any point during it. The fact that some participants did leave, indicates that many saw 
opting out as a genuine possibility. This gave me the impression that the participants 
who stayed did not feel compelled to participate against their will. In other words, in 
addition to being able to say I had obtained ‘informed consent’, I gained some 
reassurance of the relative freedom with which this consent was given. 
Participants’ freedom to leave without explanation during the discussions was 
especially important because of the topic of the research. Ethical guidelines on 
research on domestic violence (eg. World Health Organisation, 2001) warn 
researchers that they may cause survivors undue stress by making them talk about, or 
listen to talk about, the violence. I tried to decrease the chances that anyone felt 
compelled to participate in a discussion that caused them discomfort.  
The nature of the topic also made it important for me to keep the conversation away 
from actual cases of wife-beating, and focused on opinions about it. Article 1 in this 
thesis describes how I achieved this.
When I left the voice-recorder on and left the discussion, I made it clear to the 
participants that their voices would be recorded. When some asked how this affected 
their anonymity, I promised that nobody would hear their voices except myself and 
the three people who helped me transcribe and translate the discussions. I deleted the 
recordings after transcription. 
As the participants shared their time and knowledge with me, I looked for ways of 
reciprocating after each discussion by sharing knowledge that I had access to that 
could be useful to them. In some groups, this resulted in a simple reversal of roles, as 
respondents spent a half-hour or so asking me questions, as random as the ones I had 
asked them. In others, participants sought concrete practical information on issues 
they had thought of during the discussion. I also had informational material I had 
brought with me from NGOs in the capital. Some of this seemed to be appreciated 
information, for example, a booklet from the Legal and Human Rights Centre 
explaining your rights if you are stopped by the police, and one from HakiElimu on 
how to organise to improve the quality of education at your local school. 
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d. Data Analysis 
i. A constructionist approach to FGD data 
Having ensured the focus group discussions generated the type of data the method is 
good for (as described in Article 1), I also analysed the data as such: as interactive, 
group-level data on shared social norms. In other words, I did not treat the data as a 
source of information on what actually happened regarding wife-beating, or what 
individuals’ “real views” were. Instead I treated them as public discourses 
constructed collectively (Puchta & Potter, 2004; Smithson, 2000). As Smithson 
(2000) points out, taking the interactive nature of FGD data seriously makes it 
possible to analyse them for dominant normative discourses:  participants reproduce 
normative discourses in the accounts they give one another, as they refer and defer to 
the discourses they assume to be dominant. This matches what I had aimed for in de-
centering myself from the discussions and promoting inter-participant interaction: for 
the talk recorded to be accounts participants gave to one another, as they held one 
another to account for the positions they took on wife-beating. As Smithson suggests, 
then, I focused my analysis on “the discourses which are constructed within this 
group context” (Smithson, 2000, p. 110). 
I analysed the data in line with what Silverman (2006) describes as constructionist
analysis, which approaches the data as a way to tap into the respondents’ ”general 
understanding of the stock of meanings and their relationships to each other” 
(Silverman, 2006, p. 134). According to Ryen (2008), taking a constructionist 
approach is one way to address the critique of Western research methods in non-
Western contexts. As she suggests, I treat talk as performance to particular audiences, 
and treat non-Western respondents as “competent players” (p.455) – or 
“perspicacious performers”, as I phrase it in Article 1 (p.123). Moreover, I treat their 
accounts of why the beating under discussion is right or wrong as drawn from the 
discursive resources available in society. The question
What discursive resources for justifying wife-beating are available? 
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guided my analysis of the data in the direction of the overarching research question,  
What is the meaning of the wife-beating that is widely supported? 
In analysing the transcripts for ‘discursive resources’, also known as ‘accounts’ or 
‘repertoires’, my approach corresponds to what Potter (1996a, 1996b,1996c, 2004, 
2009) describes as discourse analysis: it aims to identify the devices and procedures, 
or the ‘interpretive repertoires’, that explicate the social practice of legitimating wife-
beating (1996a, pp. 134-135). It does so by examining “participants’ constructions 
and how they are accomplished and undermined”. (2004, p. 202; cited in Silverman, 
2006, p. 224). I understand the phenomena I refer to as ‘norms’, ‘values’ and ‘ideals’ 
as located within this discursive domain. 
ii. The analytic process 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the entire process through which the data in the 
transcripts were distilled into the findings presented in the articles. For the sake of 
brevity, I am describing the process as a linear one, but it also included continuous 
iteration between the stages. I often went back a stage to incorporate what I found in 
the next stage into the decisions I made at the previous stage. 
i. Developing a coding frame 
I began generating the thematic ideas (‘codes’) I would use to categorise the content 
of the transcripts during data generation. As I describe in Article 1, when the first 
FGDs didn’t work, I started playing around with different ways of conducting them. 
The field notes I took during this process to keep track of what worked and what 
didn’t included my observations of what types of topics people seemed ready to talk 
extensively about. These observations became my first code memos, in which I wrote 
themes that came up in discussions (see Appendix 1 for an example of an early 
‘codebook’). In developing the ‘coding frame’, I kept the frame separate from the 
data, going back and forth between the data and the frame to refine the frame. At first 
my codes were descriptive—simply summing up what was said—but in the course of 
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the iterative refinement process, I began to use more analytic codes, to capture what 
is implied by what is said: the logic of the argument and the mores it is referring to 
(Gibbs, 2008, p. 43).
ii. Extracting the dataset 
I then applied the codes in the final coding frame to the transcripts, and drew out the 
parts that illustrated the codes, to form my dataset. According to Potter, “sifting 
relevant materials from a large body of recording and transcript” in this way is the 
principal task of coding in discourse research (2009, p. 615). I was glad to discover, 
on listening to the recordings, that the participants had felt free to use the FGD to 
discuss other topics than those I had asked them about. The divergences ranged from 
discussing the price of some goats one participant had just bought, to conversing with 
a neighbour who greeted the group on passing by. While this was the loss of control I 
had aimed for (e.g., Bloor et al., 2001, pp. 48-49), it meant that not all parts of the 
transcripts were worth analysing. Rather than select only the parts where respondents 
did not digress from the set topic, I used the coding frame to select the relevant parts 
(see Appendix 2 for an example of this). My aim in this stage was to extract a dataset 
of all the sections that could tell me something about the respondents’ own logic on 
wife-beating, as this was what the codes sought to capture: what Bloor et al.(2001) 
call ‘logical analysis’. I returned to the transcripts several times in the course of the 
subsequent analysis in order to check that I had not left out sections whose relevance 
only became clear later on in the analysis. 
iii. Identifying commonalities across the dataset 
As mentioned while describing my site selection, a central concern I had in designing 
the research was that the findings not be written off as pertaining only to ‘other’ 
groups in society. In terms of analysis, this translates into a wariness of ‘cherry-
picking’. Silverman (2009) describes this concern well: 
Paul ten Have notes the complaint that … ‘findings… are based on a 
subjectively selected, and probably biased, ‘sample’ of cases that happen to fit 
the analytic argument’ (1998: Ch.7, p. 8). This complaint, which amounts to a 
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charge of anecdotalism, can be addressed by what Ten Have, following Mehan 
(1979) calls ‘comprehensive data treatment’. This comprehensiveness arises 
because…‘all cases of data…are incorporated in the analysis’ (1979:21).
      (Silverman, 2006, p. 298) 
A data treatment is comprehensive, according to Silverman, when the generalisations 
it yields can be applied to all the relevant data. To avoid charges that I cherry-picked 
data to fit my analysis, then, I decided to focus only on the themes that recurred 
across more than ten groups (see Appendix 3 for an example of an early attempt at 
identifying such commonalities). Rather than present a wide range of findings, I 
would analyse the few findings that recurred across most groups, for the insights that 
were the most generalizable. Once I had identified the codes that served as the 
‘lowest common denominator’ in this way, I highlighted the sections of the dataset 
that were coded with these codes. I did not remove the other sections from the 
dataset, because I wanted to be able to re-visit my decision if new connections 
emerged between the themes during the subsequent analysis. 
iv. Making sense of how the themes relate to one another 
This stage overlaps with the previous one. It is where the analysis proper started: 
reading the transcript selections to understand how the respondents’ talk achieves the 
legitimation of wife-beating, and how the various elements of the ‘discursive 
repertoire’ they draw on fit together. In all discussions, distinctions were made 
between beatings that could be legitimated and those that could not. In this sense, an 
ideal good beating that could be legitimated was constructed in all discussions. I 
therefore named this construct ‘the good beating’ and used it to organise the 
discourses legitimating wife-beating. Although this was compatible with all the 
recurring themes, some did not fit neatly into the organising scheme. I kept these to 
one side, in case they would fit better with a future organising scheme. 
v. Making theoretical sense of the data 
 Having immersed myself in the most recurrent discursive repertoires, I searched for 
theories that not only resonated with this selection of my data, but also advanced my 
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understanding of them. No one theory addressed every theme, but I arrived at two 
bodies of theory that did so between them. I present one of these in Article 2 and the 
other in Article 3. 
iii. What is left out?
The entirety of the analytic process can be seen as a whittling down of the data to 
arrive at its robust core. Articles 2 and 3 do not present the entire range of themes that 
emerged in discussions, but rather the themes that form the core of that range, in that 
they are the ones that recur across most discussions. However, in reducing the data to 
its lowest common denominator, a significant portion of the data was set aside. 
Examples of the types of data left behind can be seen in Appendices 5 and 6. While 
the entire range of data cannot be presented here, it is important to see the findings 
that are presented here in the context of this range rather than as a summary of the 
range.
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4. Findings 
The data generated by this investigation exceed those presented in the articles. In 
addition, the findings that are presented in the articles exceed those which were 
anticipated, in that they also include methodological findings. In the course of 
pursuing the research questions, I generated new knowledge to fill a gap in the 
methodological literature. My first article presents this new methodological 
knowledge, and the remaining two present the core empirical findings of the 
investigation, in light of two respective bodies of theory. 
The methodological findings presented in Article 1 address data quality concerns that 
I discovered in the course of my first focus group discussions (FGDs). Using the 
method in line with existing knowledge on how to do so in the Global South, in order 
to generate precisely the type of data FGDs are best for, failed to generate this type of 
data. This was how I discovered that the existing literature did not include knowledge 
on how to achieve the defining characteristic of FGDs—inter-participant 
interaction—in a Southern context like Tanzania. I generated this knowledge though 
a trial-and-error process that spanned more than a dozen focus groups. 
My findings here can be grouped into three. First, the initial ‘failed’ FGDs show how 
easy it can be to create research encounters that resemble FGDs yet lack the defining 
feature of FGDs—intra-group discussion—and thus do not produce the type of data 
the method is best for, namely interactive data on shared group norms. My research 
shows how unreliable and misleading data generated through such ‘group interviews’ 
can be.
Secondly, and in contrast, the final ‘successful’ FGDs, which were characterised by 
inter-participant interaction, show that when this defining characteristic of FGDs is
ensured, the method has an additional benefit. It offers a way to address some of the 
threats to data quality posed by steep power gradients, positionality and alterity 
affecting much research across difference in the Global South. 
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 Finally, the process itself of tweaking the FGDs to achieve interaction yielded new 
insights into how exactly positionality, alterity and steep power gradients can affect 
data quality. I found that the positionality issue of how the respondents perceived me, 
my role, and their role in relation to me, over-determined what they said to me. I 
found that when respondents spoke to me across such a steep power gradient, their 
talk reflected guesswork about how best to relate to me more than it reflected the 
issues I wanted to understand through their talk. No amount of skilful self-
deployment, or changes in how they saw me, changed this, as long as the power 
gradient between the respondents and their audience remained the same. It was only 
when their co-respondents replaced me as their audience that this power gradient 
changed. When, for a respondent, speaking to the researcher entails speaking across a 
steep power gradient, FGDs can circumvent the threat this poses to data quality in a 
way that the most skilful self-deployment cannot, by simply removing the researcher 
from the conversation. 
Through the process described in Article 1, I found a way, despite my undeniable 
white privilege, to generate data in Tanzania from which I could glean insights into 
hegemonic norms. From these, I constructed a hegemonic ideal. This ideal constituted 
the meanings of the wife-beating that was discussed as widely supported across a 
wide range of groups, and I called it ‘the good beating’. In Articles 2 and 3, I describe 
this finding as it relates to two debates in the literature which, though interrelated, are 
most usefully addressed independently and in turn. 
Article 2 presents the good beating as it relates to debates about the gendered nature 
of domestic violence. It shows how the good beating is justified as a way for men to 
‘do gender’ and to make sure women do, too. In this sense, many of the norms that 
discussions refer to as rendering some beatings ‘good’, are hegemonic gender norms: 
they hold people accountable to their sex category. The good beating is ‘good’ 
because spouses should behave in certain ways, based on their sex. In this sense, the 
violence supports, and is supported by, the use of sex as a primary cultural frame, 
which is how biological sex is constructed into gender, and how gender becomes a 
multilevel social structure. 
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What is the content of these sex-based behavioural prescriptions? A man should 
maintain a position of dominance in the household. A woman should show respect for 
her husband by doing as he told her, or risk social denigration. Thus the social 
meaning of the beating found here means that a husband could enforce accountability 
to certain behavioural expectations with a good beating because society expected 
women to perform that same behaviour. The behaviour the good beating enforces is 
that which society allocates to wives, and the behaviour it enacts—being in charge—
is behaviour allocated to men. In this sense, the findings contradict the gender-
symmetry claim that equates husbands beating their wives with wives beating their 
husbands. 
This article shows that the expectations that spouses perform gender was intricately 
intertwined with the understanding discussants had of the wife-beating that is 
supported. It also describes how this gender performance that was expected of 
husbands and wives was not purely discursive-symbolic, but was intended to have 
concrete material consequences. Beating was deemed good insofar as the structure 
whereby the wife works for the husband was good—a structure similar to the 
structure ordained in the “marriage contract” Bryceson (1995) describes. 
In Article 3, I present the findings within the good beating ideal that illuminate the 
socio-political role of violence and how it constitutes social order. The very 
distinction between this and ‘bad’ beatings’ actually safeguards the legitimacy of the 
social order in the way that the approval of all beating could not. Moreover, the 
grounds on which this distinction is made concerns specifically the effectiveness of 
the beating in directing the wife’s behaviour. While bad beatings were ‘dictatorial’, 
good beatings governed wives in a reasoned and reasonable manner. A good beating 
aimed at punishing wifely deviance from norms of obedience. When a wife knew this 
could happen, this knowledge alone could deter her from deviating, as she self-
censored her behaviour in order to avoid a good beating. This self-censoring effect 
defined the good beating. In this sense, wife-beating was legitimated as a form of 
social control and censure that made wives ‘self-governing’.  
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Thus the meaning ascribed to the wife-beating that was widely supported was 
violence that constituted social order. In addition, the social meaning ascribed to a 
beating was what determined whether it could have such an ‘ordering’ effect.  It was 
the perceived social legitimacy of the good beating that made it possible to achieve an 
ordering effect with it. It was women’s approval of the norms that supported the good 
beating that secured its intended effect: their approval made it a legitimate censure 
that women self-censored to avoid. In this sense, women are complicit in husbands’ 
coercive control over wives. At the same time, however, the norms to which women 
give their ‘consent’ are norms which are enforced with violence. The good beating is 
thus a case of hegemonic norms giving power, which in turn is power to enforce 
those norms. In this way, the research found that violence and support for it work 
together to diminish women’s room for manoeuvre. Norms secure the controlling 
effect of the violence, and the violence coerces consent to the norms. Coercion and 
consent coexist. 
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5. Concluding discussion 
The article format limits the extent to which I could pursue the implications of the 
findings I present there. I will now outline the directions in which I see these 
implications could be pursued. I will then discuss the limitations of the research 
presented here, including outstanding ethical concerns. Finally, I will highlight what 
can be concluded from this study, as pertains to research on the one hand, and policy 
and practice on the other. 
a. Implications  
From the stance I took in Section 2 C, understanding social reality in Tanzania is no 
more peripheral to the social scientific endeavour than understanding Northern 
realities is. I will first explore the implications of the findings for understanding 
gender and domestic violence in Tanzania. In addition to being a social scientific 
endeavour in its own right, understanding a Southern empirical reality also has 
implications for general social theory. I will therefore go on to outline some 
implications of these Tanzanian findings for theorising gender and hegemony beyond 
Tanzania. 
i. Gender and domestic violence in Tanzania 
One implication of the findings is that wife-beating can serve as a form of social 
control in Tanzania, as legitimate as formal law enforcement. The hegemonic norms 
enforced by the beating fit the definition of law presented in Section 2 D: a system of 
rules with a regime of punishments attached to ensure compliance, where the 
sanctions attached (such as beating) makes people obey. They were the norms that 
respondents across discussions referred to as commonly shared norms of interaction 
that everyone should comply with and that should be enforced by sanctions and 
punishments. In other words, they were what people themselves saw as law, and thus 
what normative pluralists label law. Insofar as beating is a response to a wife 
behaving in a way that is disapproved of as rule-breaking, it is legitimated. This 
80
means that insofar as violence is the social control of deviant wives, it is legitimated 
violence.
Thus the findings imply that the colonial and post-colonial strategy of ruling through 
informal law enforcement at community and family level is continued in 
contemporary Tanzania through the wife-beating that is tolerated. Like the men in the 
SunguSungu vigilante groups, husbands are non-state agents who use violence to 
maintain what the community sees as law and order, neither on behalf of the state nor 
rejected by it. As with the vigilantes’ norm-enforcing powers, the norm-enforcing 
powers vested in husbands do not give them free rein to use violence any way they 
like. The violence that both types of non-state agents can legitimately use is violence 
that controls deviance and upholds community norms of social order.
 The study’s findings on gender norms have implications for our understanding, not 
only of the violence in Tanzania, but also of gender relations there. In the mid-90s, as 
explained in Section 2A, scholars concluded that improvements in women’s legal and 
social position had not been accompanied by an equivalent change in gender 
ideology. In particular, the norms prescribing spousal relations that gave husbands 
structural advantages over their wives limited the extent to which women could 
benefit from their social, economic and legal gains. The findings presented here 
suggest that this is still the case. The precise content of these norms may have 
changed, but much of the ‘law’ that the good beating enforces is law about how 
husbands should control their wives’ labour, and is in this sense as much of a 
‘marriage contract’ as the one Bryceson (1995) describes.  
This has implications for how wife-beating in Tanzania relates to the changing gender 
order there. Is wife-beating men’s last defence against women’s domination of 
Tanzanian society? Or at least a sign that Tanzanian women’s empowerment has 
gone too far? The findings imply that wife-beating in Tanzania resembles the 
situation described in Section 2B instead, where gender inequality at the ideological 
level exceeds gender inequality at other levels. It is the lack of progress towards 
gender equality at the ideological level, and the fact that progress there lags behind
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progress in, for example, formal access to education and employment, that is 
connected to wife-beating. The connection is recursive: the unequal marital contract 
legitimates wife-beating, and wife-beating enforces the unequal marital contract. In 
the past in Tanzania, the maintaining of “the cultural norms pertaining to the intra-
household pooling of individual entitlements” (Bryceson, 1995a, p. 43) known as the 
marital contract has been found to limit the equalising effect of women’s access to 
independent income, as described in Section 2A. Another implication of the good 
beating ideal, then, is that it enforces norms that can undermine hard-earned structural 
gains in Tanzanian gender equality, a possibility described by Hunnicutt (2009) in 
section 2B. 
ii. Theorising gender and hegemony 
The insight just presented is an example of how some aspects of social theory 
developed in the Global North can improve our understanding of power relations 
within Southern empirical realities. The study as a whole can be seen as an 
illustration of this. It shows that feminist conceptualisations of how VAW in a society 
relates to the gender order, especially where gender is theorised as a multilevel 
structure, can help to make socio-political sense of VAW in Africa. Moreover, this 
study contributes to the mapping of the variety of not only structural but also 
ideological shapes that patriarchy takes across time, space and material contexts that, 
according to Hunnicutt (2009), further theorising on this topic requires.  
In addition, the findings illustrate the Gramscian concepts reviewed in Section 2F. 
The norms supporting the good beating exemplify the ‘common sense’ by which 
people can accept as a given, even as desirable, the practices that ensure that one 
group dominates another. The crucial role played by shared social norms in 
hegemony is illustrated by how the good beating relies on norms supporting the 
gender order for its intended ordering effect. This also illustrates how coercion and 
consent do not rule one another out, but rather work as one. The good beating is an 
example of a hegemonic process, in that it coerces subalterns into ‘choosing’ what is 
in the interests of the dominant group. 
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b. Limitations  
One limitation of this study is that the implications listed above remain largely 
unexplored. What is more serious, however, is that the findings are easily assumed to 
imply much more than they do. In stressing the importance of the hegemonic nature 
of the norms, I may give the false impression that ‘the good beating’ is a beating all 
the respondents supported, and, by extension, all Tanzanians support. This is not the 
case. The data analysed here are not data on individual opinions of wife-beating. 
Moreover, whether I interpret what a person says as evidence of the good beating 
does not necessarily mean that they support it, only that the way they talk about it 
suggests they reckon with it as a widely held ideal. In this way, also arguments 
against the good beating serve as evidence of what the good beating is. I have tried to 
be clear that the focus is on what is supported as good beating, rather than how widely 
it is supported. The latter question is better answered by survey data such as the 
Demographic and Health Survey data. Despite including a cross-section of 
respondents, my sample places certain limitations on the generalizability of my 
findings. I did not use large numbers and statistical tests to state with confidence that 
there is a high probability that this is what most people in Tanzania believe. The 
study is probably a less accurate depiction of norms among the growing minority of 
the population who live in Dar Es Salaam, than it is of rural and peri-urban residents.
Given the rapid pace of change also in rural and peri-urban areas of Tanzania, it may 
no longer be an accurate depiction of those areas either. 
Another sampling factor that decreases the generalizability of the findings  relates to 
urbanisation. Since carrying out my fieldwork, I have become more aware of how in 
places like my field sites, many households have family members working or 
studying in Dar Es Salaam or other cities who still ‘belong’ to the village. Thus the 
most wealthy or educated village members, and the ‘modern’ or ‘urban’ influence 
they represent, were not included in the discussion groups, and my results may be 
skewed towards the less wealthy, less educated and more ‘provincial’. 
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The study may be misunderstood as saying that there is no resistance and negotiation 
around the hegemonic norms presented here. By pointing out the duality of social 
structures and the recursiveness of interconnections, I have tried to avoid presenting 
people as either fully victims, dupes of their culture, or fully agents, responsible for 
their own suffering. Nevertheless, the focus has been on the factors supporting 
violence and inequality, not on the resistance and resilience of individuals facing 
violence and inequality. This may give the impression that such resistance does not 
exist, and that the negative factors I describe go unchallenged. Within such an 
impression, Tanzanian men and women do indeed seem to lack any agency. 
With hindsight, I might have reduced the chances of such a misunderstanding by 
giving more space to the evidence of resistance that I did find despite not looking for 
it. The very existence of a ‘good beating’ reveals a recognition that women are all too 
capable of agency and resistance. Almost all the descriptions of ‘behaviour worthy of 
beating’ could be termed ‘resistance’. In addition, in many discussions it was clear 
that respondents who argued against the good beating understood it as a dominant 
ideal in society – and still they opposed it. The data cannot be interpreted as evidence 
that there is no resistance to the good beating ideal in Tanzania, and that total or 
permanent hegemony has thus been achieved. 
Nevertheless, focusing the study on violence and inequality rather than on resistance 
to these is not something I would change. This is because I think knowledge about the 
forces that the people who are resisting are up against is more useful for their 
resistance than knowledge about the strength with which they are already facing those 
forces. This is in line with the pleas of feminist scholars in Tanzania, for example 
Mbilinyi (1992) who warns researchers against “highlighting strengths and silencing 
the sheer pain of living lives with few options” in their attempt to avoid negative 
stereotypes of African women (p.66).  
Two ethical issues remain that I have not succeeded in solving. The first concerns the 
people who participated in the focus group discussions. At the time of my fieldwork, 
I was glad that they did not see the discussion as a job they were paid to do, and that 
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many seemed to enjoy the discussions, and, as the recordings showed later, used the 
time to discuss their own issues. When I afterwards offered to answer their questions, 
and shared booklets and other information that might be useful for them, I felt I had 
found a way to make the information-sharing go both ways. Since then, however, I 
am less satisfied that this constitutes ‘reciprocity’ between us. I have benefited from 
our encounter more than they did. Moreover, I have not found a way to make the 
knowledge I generated from the encounter useful to the residents of the 20 villages I 
visited. I have, however, shared it with Tanzanian NGOs and governmental service 
providers, some of whom work in these regions.  
The second ethical issue that remains unresolved concerns my privilege as a Europe-
based researcher vis-à-vis researchers from, and based in, East Africa. My choice of 
theories to use and literature to refer to has been led not by solidarity with Africa-
based scholars, but by what helped me to make sense of my data. There is a 
difference between saying that theory is inapplicable to Africa if it originated 
elsewhere (a stance I reject in Section 2 C), and citing Africa-based scholars in 
recognition of the sheer perversity of the global inequalities that divide academics. I 
have not shown this kind of solidarity in citations. Where I refer to works by scholars 
based in Africa, I do so simply because I need to build on their knowledge.
c. Conclusions 
What is the meaning of the wife-beating that is widely supported in Tanzania? The 
answer this study has produced is as follows. It is as a way of making wives’ 
behaviour conform to certain social norms that beating is deemed ‘good’. It is the fact 
that these norms are gender norms that makes this violence ‘gender-based’: the doing 
of gender is cyclically intertwined with the beating that is widely supported. The 
good beating enacted masculinity and enforced submissive femininity. A beating was 
understood as enforcing gender norms, and the endorsement of those gender norms in 
turn supported the beating.  
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How does support for wife-beating in Tanzania relate to social order? The good 
beating was understood as the legitimate social control of deviance. The socio-
political role of violence in ordering society was central to the meaning of the beating 
that is widely supported. It was as a form of norm enforcement – violence that served 
to punish, discipline and maintain law and order – that beating could be ‘good’. The 
norms the good beating was supposed to enforce, and the norms that supported it, are 
what secured the good beating’s intended ordering effect.  
What conclusions can be drawn from this regarding ways of researching 
criminological and other socio-legal issues in the Global South?  Attention to the 
power dimensions of state law, of formal law enforcement, and of the social control 
of deviance has characterised critical criminology. This study has shown that 
informal hegemonic norms at community level can play the same ruling role as that 
which makes formal law, ‘law’. Thus critical criminologists engaging with African 
empirical realities should be prepared to take the same critical stance towards local 
community norms and the social control those norms entail as they do to state law 
and state social control. This is a way of taking the effects of the South’s ex-centricity 
on theory seriously, and using it as an opportunity for theoretical innovation. In other 
words, it is ‘Theory from the South’.  
What conclusions can be drawn from this study, that are useful for policy and 
practice? The study demonstrates the crucial role that norms governing interpersonal 
power relations play in violence and inequality. This implies that policy and practice 
aimed at counteracting violence and inequality cannot succeed by bypassing norms. 
The study confirms Gramsci’s point that social transformation is not possible without 
engaging with the ideological or ‘common sense’ dimension. In Tanzania, the 
informal “marriage contract” is a lynchpin in the complex and recursive nexus 
between wife-beating and gender inequality. Tinkering with the individual injuries 
caused by the violence while shying away from any contact with the fulcrum around 
which the entire machinery pivots, will not bring about the social change needed to 
end the violence and inequality. As Risman (2004) points out, the norms governing 
interpersonal interactions is where work for social change must begin. This study 
86
shows the importance of addressing the ideology of gender inequality in order to 
achieve any real progress on violence against women and women’s status. 
In addition, this study is a reminder to aid workers in general, not just those working 
on gender-specific programmes, that community norms are political. They both 
reflect and maintain power relations: in this sense they are all about ‘who rules’. 
Practitioners and policy-makers in many health and development NGOs in the region 
support hegemonic gender norms in their efforts to gain credibility as ‘respecting 
local culture’. This study has shown the coercion by which people less privileged 
than them ‘choose’ to conform to those norms in Tanzania.
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